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The Role Tax Preparers Play in Taxpayer
Compliance: An Empirical Investigation with
Policy Implications
SAGIT LEVINER†
INTRODUCTION
Each year, tens of millions of taxpayers turn to tax
professionals and agencies to prepare their returns. A 2011
report by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration found that “more than one-half of all [U.S.]
taxpayers pay someone else to prepare their Federal income
tax returns.”1 In calendar year 2008, the Internal Revenue
† Associate Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law School; Overseas Affiliated
Faculty, Ono Academic College Law Faculty (Israel); S.J.D., LL.M., University
of Michigan Law School. The author of this Article owes special thanks to the
Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law Cegla Center for Interdisciplinary Research
of the Law, where she visited while developing the research platform leading to
this Article. Special thanks also go to Kyle Richison of the IRS Office of
Research, Analysis, and Statistics (Washington, DC) for his work on the
empirical side of the analysis and to Kim Bloomquist, Ed Emblom, John Guyton,
and Mary-Helen Risler, also of the IRS National Headquarters Office of
Research, Analysis, and Statistics, for helpful conversations. Valuable
comments on earlier drafts were offered by Ilan Ben-Shalom, Steven Dean,
Yuval Feldman, David Gliksberg, Anthony C. Infanti, Edward D. Kleinbard,
Martin J. McMahon, Jr., and Theodore (Ted) P. Seto as well as the by the
participants of the fourth Annual Conference of the Empirical Legal Studies
Association (Tax Panel; USC), and the Hebrew University Faculty of Law Tax
Colloquium. The content of this Article is the opinion of the author and does not
represent the position of the Internal Revenue Service. Any error in the
empirical or theoretical analysis is the sole responsibility of the author.
1. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., MORE TAX RETURN PREPARERS
ARE FILING ELECTRONICALLY, BUT BETTER CONTROLS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE ALL
ARE COMPLYING WITH THE NEW PREPARER REGULATIONS 1 (2011) [hereinafter
TIGTA (2011)]. Earlier reports similarly indicate that approximately seventytwo million taxpayers in 2001 and seventy-three million taxpayers in 2002 paid
professional tax preparers to complete returns on their behalf. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-70, TAX ADMINISTRATION: MOST TAXPAYERS
BELIEVE THEY BENEFIT FROM PAID TAX PREPARERS, BUT OVERSIGHT FOR IRS IS A
CHALLENGE 2 (2003) [hereinafter GAO (2003)]; see also Kim M. Bloomquist et
al., Evaluating Preparation Accuracy of Tax Practitioners: A Bootstrap
Approach, IRS RESEARCH BULLETIN 77 (2007) (citing paid preparer usage data
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Service (IRS) processed approximately 86.9 million
individual federal income tax returns prepared by paid
preparers.2 This represents an upward trend of more than
4% from the 83 million paid prepared returns filed in 2007.3
According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO)
survey, the majority of taxpayers who use a paid tax
preparer believe they benefit from doing so and are
confident they do not pay more in taxes than they legally
owe.4 It is not surprising, therefore, that 87% of taxpayers
who participated in the GAO survey confirmed they are
likely to return to a paid preparer in the future.5
Despite overwhelming evidence of the key role tax
preparers assume in tax administration, prior to August
2011 the IRS did not provide oversight or set national
standards for preparers.6 Similarly, little data has been
collected and examined on tax preparers in a manner that
would enable assessment of preparers’ effect on taxpaying

for Tax Years 1996–2005). Preparation services are not limited to complicated
returns. In fact, for Form 1040EZ—which is extremely simple and only one page
long—21.1% of the ten and a half million returns filed in 2001 were signed by a
preparer, representing over two million taxpayers. See Marsha Blumenthal &
Charles Christian, Tax Preparers, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 201, 201
(Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004).
2. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INADEQUATE DATA ON PAID
PREPARERS IMPEDES EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT 1 (2009) [hereinafter TIGTA (2009)].
3. Id. See also Eric Toder, Changes in Preparation Methods, 1993–2003, 107
TAX NOTES 759, 759 (2005) (showing that from 1993 to 2003, paid tax preparer
filing grew by about 26.4% in the United States, compared with an overall
growth of approximately 13.7% in the number of returns filed). The associated
cost involved in third party tax assistance is not trivial. See, e.g., GAO (2003),
supra note 1, at 1 (estimating the cost of third party tax assistance at $14.7
billion for individual taxpayers for Tax Year 2000); Blumenthal & Christian,
supra note 1, at 203 (estimating the cost of practitioner-prepared returns at $10
billion for 2002).
4. GAO (2003), supra note 1, at 4 (indicating that 77% of taxpayers who
submitted their 2002 tax returns using a preparer reported they believe they
benefited from this service).
5. Id. at 4-5.
6. TIGTA (2011), supra note 1, at 2 (“Anyone, regardless of training,
experience, skill, or knowledge, was allowed to prepare Federal income tax
returns for others for compensation.”).
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behavior and administration.7 This Article aims to address
this deficiency.
In January 2010, the IRS recommended extensive
increases in oversight of the tax return preparer industry.8
As a result of these recommendations, effective August 2011
all tax return preparers who charge a fee for their services
are required to register and obtain a unique Preparer Tax
Identification Number (PTIN) that must be used to sign
every return they prepare.9 In view of this and other
regulatory measures expected in coming years, this Article
suggests taking a step back before contemplating further
steps. It explores existing data to shed light on tax
preparers and their effect on the tax system and its
administration. Key issues to investigate include the nature
of the service taxpayers receive from preparers and whether
noncompliant returns can be linked more to preparers, or
particular types of preparers, than to their taxpaying
clients.
Using the method of stratified random sampling detailed
in Appendix A, the Article empirically analyzes tax return
information collected from 3457 returns of filers who, in the
process of completing their 1999 tax returns, claimed the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC or EIC) and were
consequently selected for the IRS 2000 Study on EITC
Compliance.10
7. TIGTA (2009), supra note 2, at 3 (“[P]reparers use multiple identifying
numbers when dealing with the IRS, data on preparers is decentralized to more
than 20 different systems, and the systems are not integrated. Foremost, the
IRS cannot determine the population of preparers, which tax returns they
prepared, or which taxpayers they represent. Additionally, it cannot determine
if the preparers are compliant with their own tax obligations, as well as
compliant with all tax laws and regulations.”).
8. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., RETURN PREPARER REVIEW (2009), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4832.pdf
[hereinafter
RETURN
PREPARER
REVIEW].
9. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2011) (increasing the oversight of paid tax preparers).
10. The 2000 Earned Income Tax Credit Compliance Study, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. (on file with author) [hereinafter The 2000 Earned Income Tax
Credit Compliance Study]. Of the 3457 returns selected, there were 191 cases in
which the taxpayer did not appear for audit or subsequent review. These cases
are different from unlocatable taxpayers in that the IRS had a valid address for
the taxpayer, but the taxpayer ultimately failed to respond or appear for the
appointment. These 191 cases of “no show” were excluded from the analysis
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The EITC is a type of transfer subsidy administered
through the tax system.11 Supplementing the income of
individuals and families who work and earn relatively low
wages, EITC means more money in the pockets of low-tomoderate income households.12 Enacted in 1975 as an
initially modest credit, the EITC program has greatly
expanded over the years to presently encompass more than
twenty-six million recipients.13 However, as early as the
1980s, the IRS reported significant challenges with EITC
compliance, suggesting that approximately 29 to 37% of
since any EITC amount claimed by the taxpayer was automatically disallowed
with no further information captured in the database. Id.
11. The EITC represents one of the largest antipoverty tools in the United
States. In 2004 alone, over twenty-two million households received more than
forty billion dollars in refunds through the EITC, lifting more than five million
households above the poverty line. See Earned Income Tax Credit Statistics,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., available at http://www.irs.gov/individuals/
article/0,,id=177571,00.html/ (last updated Dec. 16, 2011).
12. The credit reduces the amount of tax EITC recipients owe the
government and allows for a refund when eligible taxpayers do not reach the
minimum tax threshold. See EITC Homepage: It’s Easier Than Ever to Find Out
if You Qualify for EITC, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., available at http://
www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96406,00.html (last updated Apr. 09,
2012).
13. See
EITC
Statistics,
EITC
CENTRAL,
available
at
http://www.eitc.irs.gov/central/eitcstats/ (citing Tax Year 2010) (last updated Jan. 23,
2012). For Tax Year 2010 an EITC claimant with one qualifying child is entitled
to receive a maximum credit of $3050. 2010 EITC Income Limits, Maximum
Credit Amounts and Tax Law Changes, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., available at
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=215764,00.html (last updated Dec. 6,
2011) [hereinafter 2010 EITC Income Limits]. For two or more qualifying
children, the credit reaches up to $5036. Id. A qualifying child must be nineteen
or younger at the end of the tax year, twenty-four or younger if a full-time
student (attends school full-time for a full semester or the equivalent), or any
age if classified as “permanently and totally disabled” for one year or more.
EITC, Earned Income Tax Credit, Qualifying Child Rules, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., available at http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96466,00.html
#QA2 (last updated Mar. 30, 2012). In addition to biological parents,
grandparents, aunts, uncles, and siblings can also claim a qualified child if they
shared residency with the child for more than six months of the year. Id. A
foster child also counts if he or she has been officially placed by an agency or
court. Id. at n.2. A maximum credit of $457 is available for persons and couples
without children. 2010 EITC Income Limits, supra note 13. For more details, see
Earned Income Credit (EIC): For Use in Preparing 2011 Returns, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p596.pdf (last
updated Jan. 12, 2012).
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total EITC dollars allocated to taxpayers were claimed in
error.14 Studies for Tax Years 1993–1994 and 1997–1999
generated similar findings, with the IRS estimating an
overpayment rate of about 27 to 32% of EITC dollars for Tax
Year 1999.15
In an effort to better understand and address EITC
noncompliance, the IRS launched a series of comprehensive
studies during the 1990s. The 2000 EITC Compliance
Study, which generated the database used in this Article, is
the most recent and comprehensive of all EITC studies.16 It
is also particularly detailed and thorough when compared
with other data gathering ventures the IRS has undertaken
over the past three decades.17 The study draws from Tax
Year 1999 returns where EITC was claimed and a thorough
audit and review was subsequently performed. Each return
was initially audited by IRS district examination staff,
calling for at least one face-to-face meeting with the
taxpayer. The initial audits were later reviewed by IRS tax
examiners with the Cincinnati Service Center. All initial
audits and their reviews were then sent to the appropriate
district office and assigned within the IRS examination
division.18 Importantly, the EITC Compliance Study is the
only statistical database to collect information on preparer
type and usage since the conclusion of the Taxpayer
14. George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working
Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX
POL’Y 225, 247-48 (1994) (discussing TCMP studies for Tax Years 1982, 1985,
and 1988).
15. The 2000 Earned Income Tax Credit Compliance Study, supra note 10, at
12 (the higher-bound figure assumes all “no show” cases which over claimed the
EITC credit, while the lower-bound figure assumes “no show” compliance was
the same as that exhibited by the rest of the EITC claimants in the study). The
1999 estimates represent about $8.7 to $9.9 billion in improper EITC payments
for that year alone. Id. at 10.
16. Discussions with IRS EITC assigned personal.
17. In particular, the National Research Program (NRP) conducted by the
IRS since 2001 does not offer full audits for all returns selected for the program,
but rather uses a screening mechanism to review only those (seemingly) most
problematic returns. Robert E. Brown & Mark J. Mazur, The National Research
Program: Measuring Taxpayer Compliance Comprehensively, 51 KAN. L. REV.
1255 (2003) (reviewing the NRP program).
18. See The 2000 Earned Income Tax Credit Compliance Study, supra note
10.
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Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) in the late
1980s.19 This information is indispensable for this Article
when exploring the effect of preparation mode and
characteristics on taxpayer compliance and administration.
Utilizing Statistical Analysis System (SAS) software,
this Article employs two independent variables: (1) tax
return characteristics: by line item and type of return; and
(2) preparation mode: whether the return was self prepared,
or, if prepared by someone other than the taxpayer, by type
of preparer. The Article examines compliance trends and
patterns by looking at preparer type, sorted by group as
provided in the 2000 EITC Compliance Study.20 These types
include: (1) Certified Public Accountant (CPA), (2) Attorney,
(3) Enrolled Agent, (4) Large National Chain,21 (5) Other
Professional Tax Preparer, (6) Friend/Relative, (7)
IRS/VITA/TCE,22 (8) Other, and (9) Taxpayer.23 Information
collected on preparer type nonetheless remains limited,
with two categories—Large National Chain and Other
Professional Tax Preparer—making up approximately 56%
of all returns examined.24 The low number of returns in the
19. The TCMP ran for about two decades until the late 1980s. It provides an
incredibly detailed pull of data for that time. The newer NRP was initiated in
early 2001 and in some respects provides a narrower array of data than the
TCMP. Among others, the NRP has yet to collect information on the use and
distribution of paid preparers other than indicating whether a return is paid or
self-prepared. This limited scope of data is not expected to change for at least a
few more years, until the funding and successful implementation of enforcement
and data gathering mechanisms to correspond with the 2011 preparer
regulation.
20. See The 2000 Earned Income Tax Credit Compliance Study, supra note
10.
21. This category includes, specifically, H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt.
22. The IRS offers free assistance with tax return preparation and tax
counseling using specially trained volunteers. Particularly, the Volunteer
Income Tax Assistance (VITA) and Tax Counseling for the Elderly (TCE)
programs assist seniors, individuals with low to moderate incomes, those with
disabilities, and those for whom English is a second language. See Free Tax
Return Preparation for You by Volunteers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., available
at http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=107626,00.html (last updated May
30, 2012).
23. The preparation mode of “Taxpayer,” as used in this Article, refers to
taxpayers who self prepare their own tax returns.
24. See The 2000 Earned Income Tax Credit Compliance Study, supra note
10.
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Attorney and CPA categories made it necessary to group
them together for the analysis.25
The third variable this Article utilizes—a dependent
variable—is the compliance or noncompliance of the return.
Compliance was assessed by comparing the information the
taxpayer or preparer reported on the original tax return
with the information IRS auditors recorded following their
audit and review.26
The Article examines two primary groups of returns:
the first represents the simpler Form 1040 family of
returns; the second is the more complicated and legally
ambiguous Schedule C Form returns, involving information
reported on profit or loss from sole proprietorships. In each
family of returns, several line items are explored, including:
Adjusted Gross Income, Total Tax, EITC, and Filing
Status.27 A breakdown of returns claiming itemized and
standard deductions and the rate of electronic filing among
preparation types are also provided in the appendices.
While the mode of analysis of this Article is exploratory
in nature, several predictions emerge from literature to
suggest areas that require special attention. For example,
consideration is given to whether different types of
preparers play different roles as facilitators of taxpayer
compliance and noncompliance.28 Specifically, the Article
examines whether returns filed by preparers who are
professionally licensed and trained, such as lawyers and
25. Id.
26. The “Exam Recommended Amount” from the examined returns was used
for this Article (e.g., the “Best and Final” audit and review results). One key
qualification, however, is that IRS perception of the taxpayer’s liability may not
be the only plausible interpretation of the application of the law. This might be
particularly true when more experienced preparers, such as CPAs and
Attorneys, are involved. See infra 1131-32.
27. For Tax Year 1999, $2750 was subtracted from adjusted gross income for
each eligible exemption (spouse or dependent).
28. See, e.g., Robert Kidder & Craig McEwen, Taxpaying Behavior in Social
Context: A Tentative Typology of Tax Compliance and Noncompliance, 2
TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 47, 69-70 (Jeffery A. Roth
& John T. Scholz, eds., 1989) (offering a typology of preparers in the compliance
context); see also Yuka Sakurai & Valerie Braithwaite, Taxpayers’ Perceptions of
Practitioners: Finding One Who is Effective and Does the Right Thing?, 46 J.
BUS. ETHICS 375, 384-85 (2003) (positioning preparers on a compliance scale
based on their inclination to facilitate taxpayer noncompliance).
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CPAs, indicate greater noncompliance in legally ambiguous
filing circumstances where the law can be more creatively
interpreted. Similarly, the Article explores whether other
types of preparers, such as friends and relatives of the
taxpayer, who are not licensed professionals or otherwise
regulated, make compliance discrepancies in less
complicated filing circumstances. In this case, such
discrepancies may be explained, at least partially, by
deficiencies in knowledge or skill, rather than intentional
tax planning. Finally, the Article examines whether
compliance differences exist among returns filed by
preparers as a group, as opposed to self-prepared returns
and, in this case, whether other, more nuanced categories
emerge.
By understanding the types of compliance discrepancies
associated with preparer mode and filing characteristics, we
may better understand the taxpayer-preparer relationship
and how this relationship influences taxpaying behavior
and administration. For example, noncompliance driven by
creative interpretation of ambiguous parts of the tax code
may suggest the need for rules that emphasize greater
oversight and less tolerance for noncompliance, as
illustrated in the 2011 preparer regulation.29 Furthermore,
consistent with the fact that until August 2011 the IRS did
not impose mandatory registration or affiliation
requirements on paid preparers, many of the returns
analyzed in this Article were prepared by unregulated
preparers. Accordingly, significant variance among the
kinds of errors made on returns completed by regulated and
unregulated preparers could bear important implications for
tax administration. Such implications may either
strengthen or, alternatively, cast doubts on the 2011
preparer regulation and other proposed steps. These include
not only the rules and regulations for individuals and firms
offering preparation aid, but also to preparation software,
which has come to dominate the tax preparation industry
and is presently absent from the 2011 regulation.30 The
29. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2011).
30. For an acknowledgement of the increasing role of preparation software in
tax compliance and administration see, for example, RETURN PREPARER REVIEW,
supra note 8, at 9 (“The consumer and commercial tax software industry is one
of the largest and fastest growing industries associated with tax return
preparation. Taxpayers self-prepared and electronically filed 32 million tax
returns using consumer tax preparation software during filing season 2009.
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targeted use of professional guilds could also emerge as a
solution if consistency materializes in the errors tax
preparers make.
I. TAX PREPARERS: ROLES AND USAGE
Taxpayers turn to tax assistance for a variety of
reasons. With the growing complexity of the tax code, many
taxpayers do not understand their filing requirements and
face significant difficulties completing tax forms by
themselves.31 Accordingly, a key motivation for taxpayers to
obtain tax assistance is to meet their legal obligations and
file accurate, compliant returns.32 Additional motives
include lack of time and patience to self prepare;33 the belief
that tax preparers minimize due taxes and facilitate the

These taxpayers rely on tax software to answer their tax law questions and to
assist them in the preparation of accurate returns. . . . Professional tax return
preparers also use commercial tax preparation software to prepare and
electronically file returns for their clients. During the 2009 filing season, tax
return preparers used preparation software to prepare 61.8 million tax
returns.”); see also id. at 9-10.
31. See, e.g., Historical Trends in Income and Revenue: Hearing Before the
Comm. On Fin., 111th Cong. (2010) (remarks prepared for delivery by Mark J.
Mazur, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Tax Analysis, Dep’t. of Treasury)
(describing the various measures by which the U.S. tax system has become
increasingly complex in recent decades. Among others, “the instruction book for
the primary individual income tax form has grown from 52 pages for 1980 to 174
pages for 2009. The income tax regulations have doubled, from less than 7,500
pages in 1980 to nearly 15,000 pages today.”). See id.
32. See Julie H. Collins et al., Factors Associated with Household Demand for
Tax Preparers, 12 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 9, 11 (1990); Peggy A. Hite & Gary A.
McGill, An Examination of Taxpayer Preference for Aggressive Tax Advice, 45
NAT’L TAX J. 389, 389-90 (1992). For further insight into the complexity
taxpayers face and its impact on their compliance with the tax law see, for
example, Bridging the Tax Gap: Hearing Before the Comm. On Fin., 108th Cong.
146 (2004) (statement of Mark W. Everson, Commissioner, Internal Revenue
Service) (“We believe . . . that a significant factor contributing to the tax gap is
the enormous complexity of our tax laws. For taxpayers, complexity makes it
harder to understand and apply the tax laws.”).
33. See GAO (2003), supra note 1, at 8 (“[F]or example, a mother of four who
operates her own business part-time and is finishing her degree at night said
she simply does not have the time to do her own taxes.”).
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receipt of larger or quicker refunds;34 and the idea that
preparers save taxpayers money more generally—for
example, by reducing the probability of an audit or penalty
in the event of an actual audit.35
When taxpayers seek tax return filing assistance, they
face a rather heterogeneous selection of preparers. Based on
their professional disposition, paid tax preparers belong to
one of three key affiliations.36 The first group includes
licensed professionals such as Attorneys and CPAs.37 The
second group includes Enrolled Agents.38 Registered Tax
Return Preparers comprise the third group.39 Comparing
these three groups of preparers, licensed professionals
prescribe to a heightened degree of scrutiny and training, as
they are professionally regulated and registered by state
licensing agencies.40 Enrolled Agents are preparers who are
not professionally licensed, but earn IRS authorization to
prepare returns and practice before it by passing an
examination on tax matters or demonstrating past IRS
employment experience.41 Finally, pursuant to the 2011
34. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SURVEY OF TAX PRACTITIONERS AND
ADVISERS (1987); Frances L. Ayres et al., The Economic Benefits of Regulation:
Evidence from Professional Tax Preparers, 64 ACCT. REV. 300, 302 (1989).
35. See Anne L. Christensen, Evaluation of Tax Services: A Client and
Preparer Perspective, 14 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 60, 61 (1992); Hite & McGill, supra
note 32, at 390.
36. 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2006) (authorizing the secretary of the treasury to
regulate the practice of representatives before the Department of the Treasury).
These regulations are published as “Regulations Governing Practice” before the
Internal Revenue Service. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2011) (detailing the different
groups of authorized paid tax preparers. The title indicates two additional
preparer categories that are not addressed in this Article: Enrolled Actuaries
and Enrolled Retirement Plan Agents. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(d),(e)).
37. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(a),(b).
38. Id. § 10.3(c).
39. Id. § 10.3(f).
40. Id. § 10.3(a); TIGTA (2009), supra note 2, at 1.
41. 31 C.F.R. § 10.4(a),(d). Until the 2011 preparer regulation, Enrolled
Agents were the only taxpayer representatives who received their right to
practice from the federal government. See TIGTA (2009), supra note 2, at 1
(“Enrolled agents. These professionals pass an IRS examinations or present
evidence of qualifying experience as former IRS employee and have been issued
an enrollment card. Enrolled Agents are the only taxpayer representatives who
receive their right to practice from the Federal Government.”).

2012]

TAX PREPARERS AND COMPLIANCE

1089

preparer regulation, all other paid tax preparers—
previously unregulated—are now required to register and
remain in compliance with the status of Registered Tax
Return Preparer.42 To become a Registered Tax Return
Preparer, a preparer must: (1) pass a one-time competency
examination, (2) pass a suitability check, and (3) obtain a
unique PTIN and pay the amount required in the PTIN
User Fee regulations.43
In addition to the variance in the regulatory
requirements detailed above, preparers may offer their
services in a variety of capacities and can accordingly
adhere to different industry norms and regulations. These
include, among others, preparers who offer tax assistance in
large-to-mid-size accounting or law firms, national
preparation chain services, a mom-and-pop type tax shop, or
in the context of personal acquaintance (friends or relatives
of the taxpayer).44 According to the TCMP database, for Tax
Year 1988, about 30% of taxpayers using a paid tax return
preparer turned to CPAs, 17% hired national tax services,
and 2% employed attorneys, while most taxpayers (52%)
engaged other preparers.45 As of March 2006, several
hundred thousand CPAs and attorneys were authorized to
42. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(f) (defining who is a registered tax return preparer); §
10.4(d) (defining eligibility requirements to become an enrolled agent, enrolled
retirement plan agent, or registered tax return preparer). Note, however, that
the new preparer regulation addresses only those preparers who offer their
services for a fee. Id. § 10.3 (2011). This is as opposed, for example, to friends
and relatives of the taxpayer who may offer preparation services for free and
remain unaffected by the new regulation.
43. Id. § 10.4(d). “To allow preparers a transition period to pass the
competency examination, and because the competency examination was not
available at the time the final regulations were published, individuals who
obtain a provisional PTIN before the competency examination [was] offered may
prepare for compensation any tax return or claim for refund until December 31,
2013, as long as the individuals renew their PTIN, pass a suitability check, and
pay the applicable user fee.” TIGTA (2011), supra note 1, at 3.
44. See, e.g., GAO (2003), supra note 1, at 2; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-06-563T, PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS: IN A LIMITED STUDY, CHAIN
PREPARERS MADE SERIOUS ERRORS 1 (2006) [hereinafter GAO (2006)].
45. The more accurate distribution for TY 1988 was CPAs: 29%; Large
National Chains: 17%; Attorneys: 2%; Other preparers: 52%. Blumenthal &
Christian, supra note 1, at 205 (citing Charles W. Christian, Voluntary
Compliance with the Individual Income Tax Results from the 1988 TCMP Study,
IRS RES. BULL. 35, 38 tbl. 7 (1994)).
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practice before the IRS, and there were about 41,000 active
Enrolled
Agents.46
Information
about
unregulated
preparers—who represented the main source of preparation
tax services until the 2011 regulation—is more obscure
because these preparers generally did not partake in an
official registries. However, according to a National
Taxpayer Advocate Report, the number of unregulated
preparers ranged from 300,000 to 600,000 in 2003.47 Since
tax return data suggests an upward trend of preparer
usage, these numbers have likely increased over the years.48
II. TAX PREPARERS AS GATE KEEPERS: PROMISES AND
CAVEATS
With the growing numbers of taxpayers who turn to
third party preparation assistance, tax preparers have
become critical gatekeepers for the tax system and its
administration.49 Nevertheless, relying on preparers to
provide competent or otherwise reliable service has not been
without challenges. In 2003, the GAO reported that
taxpayers tend to believe their preparers exercise sufficient
due diligence to ensure accurate and compliant returns.50
Approximately 91% of taxpayers believed they provided
their preparers adequate information about their filing
circumstances to allow preparers to complete accurate

46. GAO (2006), supra note 44, at 1 (citing “IRS Officials” as a source of
reference).
47. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL’N NO. 2104, NATIONAL TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE: 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 270 (2003) (refraining from citing
a source of reference for the estimates).
48. See, e.g., supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (discussing the upward
trend in preparer usage).
49. A survey of the IRS Oversight Board identified that the two key sources
of reliance for taxpayers are: (1) IRS representatives, and (2) Paid Tax
Professionals. Interestingly, in both cases taxpayers show identical rates of
overall reliance (83%) with minor adjustments when it comes to the degree of
reliance: whether taxpayers feel the service provided was very valuable (IRS
Representatives—52%; Paid Tax Professionals—51%) or somewhat valuable
(IRS Representatives—31%; Paid Tax Professionals—32%). See IRS OVERSIGHT
BD., ANNUAL REPORT 16, ix app. (2004) (quoting IRS OVERSIGHT BD. 2003 IRS
OVERSIGHT BD. TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY (2003)).
50. GAO (2003), supra note 1, at 4-6.
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returns.51 An estimated 88% of these taxpayers stated their
preparers
asked
them
to
present
supporting
documentation.52 Despite these reassuring indications,
numerous deficiencies identified on paid-prepared returns
suggest reasons for concern.
At least two million taxpayers overpaid their 1998 taxes
by approximately $945 million because they claimed the
standard deduction when it was more beneficial to itemize.53
About half of these taxpayers used a paid tax preparer.54
Similarly, in about 230,000 returns filed by preparers in
2001, taxpayers appeared eligible for an Additional Child
Tax Credit they did not claim.55 And, in Tax Year 1999,
some taxpayers claimed about $11 billion more in EITC
than they were legally entitled to while others
underclaimed $710 million.56 Paid tax preparers filed
approximately two-thirds of all EITC returns.57
In an effort to collect more information on tax preparers
and the quality of service they offer their clients, the GAO
conducted a field study in 2007.58 In this study, GAO
employees visited nineteen chain-affiliated tax preparers.59
Using two hypothetical case scenarios drawn from everyday
tax circumstances, the GAO employees represented
themselves to preparers as if they were ordinary taxpayers
shopping for tax preparation assistance.60 Strikingly, nearly
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-509, TAX DEDUCTIONS:
FURTHER ESTIMATES OF TAXPAYERS WHO MAY HAVE OVERPAID FEDERAL TAXES BY
NOT ITEMIZING 3, 6 (2002).
54. Id. at 3.
55. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO. 2003-40-046, ANALYSIS OF
STATISTICAL INFORMATION FOR RETURNS WITH POTENTIALLY UNCLAIMED
ADDITIONAL CHILD TAX CREDIT 1-2 (2003).
56. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES
TAX CREDIT CLAIMED ON 1999 RETURNS 10 (2002).

FOR

EARNED INCOME

57. Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers,
in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 148, 159 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod
eds., 2004) (citing unpublished IRS data).
58. See GAO (2006), supra note 44.
59. See id. at 3 (explaining that GAO staff focused on several commercial
chain preparers in a major metropolitan area).
60. Id.
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all of the returns completed by preparers during the GAO
site visits were incorrect to some extent.61 Some of the most
serious deficiencies involved incidents where preparers
failed to report side income (ten out of nineteen cases), did
not itemize deductions at all or failed to claim available
deductions (seven out of nine cases), did not ask where a
child lived or ignored relevant information and claimed an
ineligible child for EITC (five out of ten cases), and failed to
take the most advantageous postsecondary education tax
benefits (three out of nine cases).62 These deficiencies
translated to unwarranted refunds of up to nearly $2000 in
five instances, while in two cases they cost the taxpayer
over $1500.63 Further, many of the issues identified in the
GAO study put the preparer, taxpayer, or both at risk of
IRS enforcement actions for violations such as negligence or
willful or reckless disregard of tax rules.64
Until the 2011 preparer regulation, chain-affiliated
preparers were not held to state or federal licensing or other
external training requirements, which may explain some of
the deficiencies identified in the GAO study.65 Chain
preparers, however, are not the only group of preparers to
exhibit disconcerting behavior. Using the TCMP database
for Tax Year 1979, Erard found that noncompliance occurs
more on paid-prepared, rather than self-prepared, returns.66
Further, Erard predicted the highest mean level of
noncompliance for returns filed by the greater regulated
and trained preparer types of CPAs and Attorneys.67
Specifically, if a taxpayer’s preparation mode changed from
self-prepared to CPA- or Attorney- prepared, noncompliance
increased by a factor of about 4.5.68 In contrast, the
61. Id. at 5 (detailing the various errors identified during the GAO study).
62. Id. at 5, 16-21.
63. Id. at 5, 14.
64. Id. at 14.
65. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N 2014, NATIONAL TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE : FY 2002 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1, 228 (2002). (recommending
Congress establish a minimum threshold of paid preparer competency in order
to improve preparation services and enhance taxpayer compliance).
66. Brian Erard, Taxation With Representation: An Analysis of the Role of
Tax Practitioners in Tax Compliance, 52 J. PUB. ECON. 163, 191 (1993).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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noncompliance of a taxpayer switching from self-prepared to
a different type of preparer rose by only 15%.69
More generally, the GAO utilized the National Research
Program (NRP) database to report a higher error rate on
paid-prepared returns (56%), as compared with selfprepared filing (47%).70 Introduced by the IRS in 2001, the
NRP caters to the IRS’s research needs after the conclusion
of the more intrusive and costly TCMP.71 Unlike the latter,
NRP has yet to collect return information regarding
different categories of preparers; it considers only whether
tax returns are self- or paid-prepared. Utilizing the simpler
self- or paid-preparer metric, the GAO found the disparity
in error rates between the two preparation modes
translated to significant differences in the dollar amount
taxpayers owe after audit.72 For Tax Year 2001, taxpayers
filing paid-prepared returns were liable for a median of
$363 after audit; those who self-prepared owed a median of
about half that amount.73
69. Id. Unfortunately, Erard’s analysis does not offer a coherent theory for its
findings nor can it be interpreted to suggest clear insights for a typology of
noncompliance among different categories of preparers, assuming such a
typology exists. See also SURVEY OF TAX PRACTITIONERS AND ADVISERS, supra note
34, at 2 (discussing the categories of preparers); Ayres et al., supra note 34, at
306-07 (discussing compliance in the context of CPA-and non-regulated tax
preparers). But cf. Richard G. Broody & John J. Masselli, Tax Preparers: Whose
Team Are They On?, NAT’L PUB. ACCT. 18, 20 (1996); Andrew D. Cuccia, The
Effects of Increased Sanctions on Paid Tax Preparers: Integrating Economic and
Psychological Factors, 16(1) J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N. 41, 58-59 (1994) (noting tax
preparers can help prevent noncompliance by “reducing the aggressiveness of
their recommendations”).
70. GAO (2006), supra note 44, at 27 (explaining that the error rates
identified are applicable across income groups).
71. See, e.g., A Closer Look at the Size and Source of the Tax Gap: Hearing
Before the Comm. On Fin. (2006) (testimony of Mark J. Mazur, Director,
Research, Analysis, and Statistics, Internal Revenue Service) (explaining that
the IRS tax estimations for taxpayer compliance were based on the TCMP
program which consisted of line by line audits of random sample of returns and
was both extremely burdensome on taxpayers and expensive to administer).
72. GAO (2006), supra note 44, at 27-28.
73. Specifically, self-prepared returns were liable to a median of $185 after
audit, compared with a median of $363 for paid prepared returns. Id. at 28. The
disparity in taxes owed was identified for every income level except for the
$40,000-60,000 and $60,000-80,000 ranges, in which the differences were not
statistically significant. Id.
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With the growing scope of and reliance on tax preparer
assistance, even a small number of the millions of taxpayers
who are aided by tax preparers and end up filing erroneous
returns may amount to large sums of unwarranted tax
payments. More troubling than any associated short-term
dollar loss are the long-term repercussions of such filing
patterns. The characteristics of tax noncompliance are
pestilential; a few bad apples, either on the preparer or
taxpayer end, can easily affect the broader taxpaying
community, generating a much larger compliance problem
in both quality and breadth.74
III. THE INSTIGATOR(S) OF NONCOMPLIANCE: MIXED
EVIDENCE AND ONE HYPOTHESIS
Despite
circumstantial
evidence
suggesting
disconcerting tax filing behavior, research to date remains
inconclusive regarding who instigates aggressive tax
dispositions—the taxpayer or the preparer. To a large
74. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS IN VICE MARKETS IN VIRTUE 137-43
(2005). Braithwaite explains the role of tax advisors as the driving force behind
what started as a supply-side tax shelter industry in Australia and the United
States during the 1980s. He demonstrates how advisors fueled this industry
well into the twenty-first century. Particularly, Braithwaite describes the
epidemic-like effect of aggressive tax practices on the taxpayer community, as
noncompliance spread from tax advisors to taxpayers through the shaping of
compliance attitudes and behaviors. See id. Braithwaite’s insight is consistent
with Hite, who found that taxpayers relying on professional tax assistance
during IRS office audits exhibit more negative attitudes toward the tax system
than those who self-prepare. See Peggy A. Hite, The Preparer Effect on IRS
Customer Satisfaction, 14 ADVANCES IN TAX’N 159, 176 (2002); see also Loretta J.
Stalans et al., Listening to Different Voices: Formation of Sanction and
Taxpaying Norms, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 119, 123, 130-36 (1991) (finding
that third party involvement, especially mass media, can increase negative
attributes). One key question is whether causation exists between third party
involvement and either an increase in negative taxpayer attitudes and/or actual
behavior toward compliance, or whether the link consists of correlation only. For
additional research into the plague-like characteristics of tax noncompliance in
the context of tax transactions and schemes, see also S. COMM. ON FINANCE ON
TAX GAP AND TAX SHELTERS A-1-A-5 (2004) (written testimony of Nina Olson,
National Taxpayer Advocate) (discussing the need for reform to prevent the
spread of noncompliance as perpetuated by overly aggressive tax planning); cf.
James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818, 845-46
(1998) (reporting that individuals with negative attitudes toward the tax
administration generally have higher rates of tax evasion).
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extent, this lack of clarity is due to a shortage in relevant
tax return information and, accordingly, a notable
deficiency in empirical studies in this area. Relying on
survey information, Hite and McGill find that taxpayers are
likely to agree with their preparer’s advice, whether
conservative or aggressive, even though they may prefer
conservative counsel.75 Hite and McGill not only underscore
the heavy reliance taxpayers place on their preparers, but
they also suggest tax preparers are likely to be the source of
aggressive tax planning.76 In contrast, Schisler suggests it is
the taxpayer who instigates aggressive tax dispositions.77
Schisler finds that taxpayers are generally more belligerent
with taxes due, have lower equity perceptions of the tax
system, and are particularly aggressive when ambiguous
tax issues are involved.78
The inconclusiveness of existing findings appears less
surprising when taking a closer look at the intricacies of the
taxpayer-preparer relationship. Tax preparers bear a duty
to act in their client’s interest while also upholding the law.
This often leads preparers to a dual agency problem. The
manner in which preparers address this tension and
whether they provide service that aggressively challenges
the tax law—as opposed to more conservative and possibly
compliant counsel—depends on various factors.79 Over the
years, much of the modern literature on taxpayer-preparer
75. See Hite & McGill, supra note 32, at 390 (finding that, on average,
taxpayers do not have a preference for aggressive tax advice).
76. Id. See also Lin Mei Tan, Taxpayers’ Preference for Type of Tax Advice
from Tax Practitioners: A Preliminary Examination, 20 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 431,
432, 443 (1999) (surveying a group of business taxpayers in New Zealand to
confirm Hite and McGill’s findings from 1992).
77. Dan L. Schisler, Equity, Aggressiveness, Consensus: A Comparison of
Taxpayers and Tax Preparers, ACCT. HORIZONS, 74, 84-86 (1995).
78. See id.; see also Ayres et al., supra note 34, at 306-07; Cuccia, supra note
69, at 53-59 (providing results of behavioral studies).
79. The tax literature identified more than two-dozen factors that potentially
affect the aggressiveness of tax assistance. These include, among others, client
payment status, client aggressiveness, preparer risk preference, client age,
preparer age, client gender, preparer gender, perceived audit probability,
importance of client, preparer experience level, and previous success in revenue
negotiations. See, e.g., Valerie C. Milliron, A Conceptual Model of Factors
Influencing Tax Preparers’ Aggressiveness, in CONTEMPORARY TAX RESEARCH 1,
2-4 (Shane Moriarity and Julie H. Collins eds., 1988) (reviewing literature).
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compliance emphasized, in particular, the role of legal
ambiguity. Specifically, according to the seminal work of
Klepper and Nagin and Klepper et al., tax professionals
exploit the law when the legal nature of items on their
client’s returns is ambiguous, but enforce the law when it is
relatively clear.80 This Article revisits this hypothesis while
adding the nuanced factor of preparer type. Accordingly,
looking at different categories of preparers, the Article
examines tax return compliance in legally ambiguous filing
circumstances—specifically, Schedule C Form returns—
compared with more legally clear-cut cases, such as the
determination of taxpayers’ filing status. Intermediate
cases, including compliance on the Adjusted Gross Income,
Total Tax, and EITC line items, are also explored to provide
a broader and more thorough perspective.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS
A. Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)
The analysis begins with a breakdown of tax return
compliance results according to preparer type, looking
initially at compliance on the Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)
line item. These results are documented in Table 1 and
Figure 1. Surprisingly, Enrolled Agent, the only preparer
type directly regulated and trained by the IRS until the
80. Steven Klepper et al., Expert Intermediaries and Legal Compliance: The
Case of Tax Preparers, 34 J.L. ECON. 205, 218, 227-28 (1991); Steven Klepper &
Daniel Nagin, The Role of Tax Preparers in Compliance, 22 POL’Y SCI. 167, 16869 (1989). Some suggest, however, the enforcer-exploiter thesis falls short of
adequately capturing the full range of the taxpayer-tax preparer relationship.
This may be especially the case with regard to line items where the application
of the law is generally clear—for example, income reported by sole-proprietors
or the claiming of various tax credits, such as the EITC. Available compliance
data suggests that sole-proprietor underreporting accounts for about $68 billion
of the tax gap and that close to one-third of the dollar amount claimed for EITC
is in error. While the law governing these two categories is complex, it is also
generally unambiguous. See LESLIE BOOK, NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. ANN. REP. TO
CONG., STUDY OF THE ROLE OF PREPARERS IN RELATION TO TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS 48-49 (2007) (citing Leslie Book, Preventing the
Hybrid from Backfiring, WIS. L. REV. 1103, 1110-14 (2006)). According to Book,
in such circumstances efforts to increase compliance by imposing heightened
requirements of legal certainty may not have much effect if noncompliance is
not related to the exploitation of legal ambiguity. Id. at 48.
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2011 regulation,81 exhibits the highest number of returns
with change to AGI after IRS audit and review: 61%.
Enrolled Agent is followed by CPA/Attorney, at 49.2% of
returns with change; IRS/VITA/TCE, at 45.1%; and Other
Professional Preparer, with 44.5% change.
When the analysis examines the rate of change (either
negative or positive) from claimed AGI among returns with
change—as well as the net change on all returns—similar
results emerge with the highest change rates identified on
returns prepared by: Other Preparer, with 36.3% change
among returns with change and 14.7% net change; Other
Professional Preparer, with 33.5% change among returns
with change and 13.4% net change; CPA/Attorney, with
32.2% change among returns with change and 14.2% net
change; and Enrolled Agent, with 27.1% change among
returns with change and 15.4% net change. Together, these
results reveal high levels of error among returns filed both
by professionally licensed and regulated preparers
(CPAs/Attorneys and Enrolled Agents) and by those who,
until the 2011 preparer regulation, mostly operated under
the regulatory radar (particularly, Other Professional
Preparers and Other Preparers).
Interestingly, the preparation mode to exhibit relatively
consistent and compliant results is the Taxpayer, with 34%
of self-prepared returns with change to AGI after IRS audit
and review, 23.7% change from claimed AGI among returns
with change, and 8.6% net change to AGI among selfprepared returns generally. However, the weighted average
change of the dollar amount claimed in the Taxpayer
category is not trivial, amounting to $3444.82
Looking at the rate of change from claimed AGI, both
net and among returns with change, the preparation modes
that show the most compliant results are IRS/VITA/TCE
and Large National Chain, both displaying about half the
rate of change from claimed AGI compared with the
categories of CPA/Attorney and Enrolled Agent.83 Exploring
81. See supra note 41.
82. See infra Table 1.
83. IRS/VITA/TCE returns show 15.1% change among returns with change
and 6.4% net change; Large National Chain returns show 19.8% change among
returns with change and 6.9 net change. See infra Table 1. However,
considering the relatively lower number of returns filed in the IRS/VITA/TCE
category (408,495 returns out of 16,944,452 returns total), coupled with the
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the rate of change from claimed AGI among returns with
change, the returns filed by Other Preparers appear least
compliant: 36.3% rate of change. Returns submitted by
Other Preparers are also second least compliant on the net
change category, with 14.7%; and show the highest
weighted average change to AGI, at $4506.84
Table 1
Weighted
Returns

% of
Returns
with
Change to
AGI

%
Change
from
Claimed
AGI
(Net)

% Change
from
Claimed
AGI (Ret
w/Change)

Weighted
Average
Change

CPA/Attorney

897,341

49.2%

14.2%

32.2%

$4191

Enrolled Agent

307,637

61.0%

15.4%

27.1%

$3875

Friend/Relative
Large National
Chain

1,656,610

31.1%

7.4%

24.3%

$2742

4,542,802

37.5%

6.9%

19.8%

$2653

IRS/VITA/TCE

408,495

45.1%

6.4%

15.1%

$1493

Other Preparer
Other
Professional
Tax Preparer

641,660

38.3%

14.7%

36.3%

$4506

5,905,418

44.5%

13.4%

33.5%

$3990

Taxpayer

2,584,490

34.4%

8.6%

23.7%

$3444

Total

16,944,452

Type of
Preparer

lower associated dollar value of weighted average change in the category
($1493), the higher identified rates of change for IRS/VITA/TCE (both net and
among returns with change) may be outliers.
84. See supra Table 1.
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Figure 1

The AGI analysis findings may be explained, at least
partially, by the complexity of the returns examined. The
financial circumstances of EITC claimants are generally
rather intricate.85 This complexity may influence how well
preparers are able to interpret and apply the law. Further,
paid preparer usage is more likely among taxpayers with
complicated returns, which may contribute to the higher
rates of change on returns filed by preparers as opposed to
self-prepared returns.86 Increases in the complexity of
returns might be particularly relevant for taxpayers who
turn to the most trained and experienced preparers, such as
CPAs, Attorneys, or Enrolled Agents.
This hypothesis is explored below by examining the
breakdown of preparer mode across the more complicated
Schedule C Form returns. As Figure 2 illustrates,
CPAs/Attorneys and Enrolled Agents complete a larger
85. See, e.g., Stephen D. Holt, Keeping it in Context: Earned Income Tax
Credit Compliance Treatment of the Working Poor, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 183,
197-98 (2007) (discussing, among others, the issue of frequent job and family
transitions affecting EITC recipients and their tax filing circumstances).
86. See, e.g., Erard, supra note 66, at 187 (noting that taxpayers with
complex returns were more likely to seek tax preparation assistance); see also
Jeffrey A. Dubin et al., The Demand for Tax Return Preparation Services, REV.
OF ECON. & STAT. 74, 75-82 (1992) (describing the groups more likely to choose a
form of paid or nonpaid tax preparation service).
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percentage of Schedule C Form returns relative to the total
number of returns they prepare. The increased share of
Schedule C Form returns may contribute to the legal
complexity and hence the risk of error in these categories.87
Figure 2

To account for the effect of legal complexity, the
analysis narrows on Schedule C Form returns only and
examines whether exclusively looking at more complicated
filing circumstances across preparation modes alters
compliance results. The findings of this manipulation are
documented in Table 2 and Figure 3.
Looking exclusively at schedule C Form returns, the
rate of returns with change to AGI emerges as consistently
high among all preparer types, with some decrease in the
IRS/VITA/TCE category.88 Further narrowing the analysis
87. See also infra Appendix C (exploring the finer-tuned itemized, as opposed
to standard, deductions returns, and offering similar results for the distribution
of these more complicated filing circumstances across preparation types).
88. The reduced error rate in the IRS/VITA/TCE category is especially
evident in the rate of change from claimed AGI among returns with change
(4.2%) and net change (2.9%). This could be explained by considering the
relatively low weighted average change in the IRS/VITA/TEC category
narrowed to Schedule C Form returns ($1132) as well as the lower number of
returns filed by this category, compared with other preparation types (20,860
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to explore the rate of change from claimed AGI, particularly
among returns subject to change (that is, returns identified
as noncompliant after IRS audit and review), the returns
completed by CPAs/Attorneys and Enrolled Agents do not
appear significantly more problematic than those filed by
other types of preparers. In fact, subsequent to
IRS/VITA/TCE, CPAs/Attorneys exhibit the second lowest
rate of returns with change to AGI and net change from
claimed AGI, with Large National Chains and
Friends/Relatives following closely behind.89 Enrolled
Agents, while not radically different from other preparation
types, perform rather poorly: they show the second highest
change rate from claimed AGI (net as well as among returns
with change) and the highest weighted average change
($6035).90 In addition, when limiting the analysis to explore
Schedule C Form returns, the Taxpayer category is not
more compliant than other preparation types, with the
weighted average dollar adjustment ranking among the
highest, at $5248.91
The results of the AGI analysis narrowed to Schedule C
Form returns can be read as consistent with Klepper and
Nagin and Klepper et. al., in suggesting that legally
ambiguous filing circumstances, such as those associated
with Schedule C Form returns, correlate with increases in
noncompliance.92 Noncompliance appears in our database in
the form of change to the line item explored after IRS audit
and review (here, AGI). Increases in the rates and scope of
change, however, are not limited to certain types of
preparation modes. They are evident across all preparation
categories, as shown in Table 2 and Figure 3. In fact, the
rate of returns with change to AGI is particularly high
among self-preparing taxpayers, second by only 0.2% to
Friends/Relatives and Other Preparers, where the rate of
returns with change is highest (78.7%).93 Further, the
Schedule C Form returns filed by IRS/VITA/TCE compared with a total of
3,125,243 Schedule C returns filed generally). See infra Table 2, Figure 3.
89.

See infra Table 2, Figure 3.

90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Klepper et al., supra note 80 and accompanying text; Klepper &
Nagin, supra note 80 and accompanying text.
93. See infra Table 2.
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financial implications of IRS audit and review of selfprepared returns is also among the highest, showing a
weighted average change of $5248.94
Notably, when considering AGI reported on Schedule C
Form returns, the CPA/Attorney mode, as well as
Relative/Friend, Large National Chain, and IRS/VITA/TCE
categories are associated with more compliant returns,
compared with the Taxpayer. These findings may indicate a
mitigating effect of these preparation types on taxpayer
noncompliance in the context of Schedule C Form returns.
Conversely, use of some preparation modes, such as Other
Professional Preparer and Enrolled Agent under these
circumstances, may lead to greater noncompliance than
self-preparation in terms of financial gain of noncompliance,
measured by the weighted average dollar change, even
though the actual rate or incidences of change may in fact
be lower in these categories.95
Although the Taxpayer category is second highest on
the rate of returns subject to change in the AGI analysis
narrowed to Schedule C Form returns, the actual rate of
change to AGI (net as well as among returns with change)
does not differ significantly from other preparation
categories. In fact, the categories of Other Professional
Preparer and Enrolled Agent, for example, both display
greater rates of change to AGI, compared with self-prepared
returns. This may suggest that at least some errors on selfprepared returns do not result in financial benefits to the
taxpayer compared with returns filed by potentially better
informed or more sophisticated preparers, such as Other
Professional Preparers and Enrolled Agents. In this case,
lower preparation skills on the taxpayer end, rather than
intentional tax planning, might be the reason for such
errors.96
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. Future analysis should look into the distribution and extent to which
adjustments made on tax returns after IRS audit and review result in tax
increase or decrease in the tax liability of the taxpayer. This is helpful in order
to better assess the reasons for the discrepancies between the information
reported on the original tax returns and the information concluded after IRS
audit and review as well as the effective mechanisms to enhance taxpayer
compliance more generally.
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Table 2
Type of Preparer

Weighted
Returns
With Sched
C

% of
Returns
with a
Schedule C

% of
Returns
with
Change
to AGI

%
Change
from
Claimed
AGI (Net)

% Change
from
Claimed
AGI (Ret
w/Change)

Weighted
Average
Change

CPA/Attorney

291,801

32.5%

71.1%

20.4%

33.3%

$4035

Enrolled Agent

164,479

53.5%

74.5%

32.0%

44.5%

$6035

Friend/Relative
Large National
Chain

213,033

12.9%

78.7%

23.9%

32.9%

$3009

585,008

12.9%

73.1%

22.2%

30.5%

$3614

IRS/VITA/TCE

20,860

5.1%

66.7%

2.9%

4.2%

$1132

Other Preparer
Other Professional
Tax Preparer

69,813

10.9%

78.7%

25.0%

39.2%

$4260

1,343,677

22.8%

74.9%

37.5%

52.3%

$5519

436,572

16.9%

78.5%

28.8%

35.1%

$5248

3,125,243

18.4%

Taxpayer
Total

Figure 3
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B. Total Tax
To build on the AGI findings, the analysis moves to
examine return compliance on the line item of Total Tax.
These results are displayed in Table 3 and Figure 4.
Analysis of compliance results across preparation types
reveals that the categories CPA/Attorney and Enrolled
Agent again exhibit the highest rates of returns where IRS
examiners recommended change to the amount originally
claimed—at 46.7 and 57.4%, respectively. However, the
magnitude of the change made to Total Tax on returns
prepared by CPAs/Attorneys and Enrolled Agents,
measured as the percentage change from the amount which
was determined after IRS audit and review, was among the
lowest, with only returns prepared by the Taxpayer showing
a smaller percentage change (118.3, 112, and 111.5%
adjustment among returns with change; and 71.2, 73.7 and
64.1% net change, respectively).97
Other Preparers and Other Professional Preparers
perform most poorly on the magnitude of change, both net
and among returns with change: 305 and 195.4% change
among returns with change; and 164.4 and 110.4% net
change, in that order.98 This significantly exceeds the
adjustments made on returns prepared by CPAs/Attorneys,
Enrolled Agents, and the Taxpayer. Friends/Relatives and
Large National Chain returns are in the middle of the
compliance results, at 84.3 and 92.8% net change; and 147.6
and 174.2% change among returns with change,
respectively.99

97. Compliance in the self-preparation mode initially appears more
pronounced on the Total Tax than AGI analysis. See supra Table 1, Figure 1
(AGI analysis); infra Table 3, Figure 4 (Total Tax analysis).
98. See infra Table 3, Figure 4.
99. Id.

2012]

TAX PREPARERS AND COMPLIANCE

1105

Table 3
Type of
Preparer

Weighted
Returns

% of
Returns
with
Change to
Total Tax

% Change
to Total
Tax (Net)

% Change
to Total
Tax
(Among
Returns
w/change)

Weighted
Average
Change
(Among
Returns
w/change

CPA/Attorney

897,341

46.7%

71.2%

118.3%

$794

Enrolled
Agent

307,637

57.4%

73.7%

112.0%

$1003

Friend/Relative
Large
National
Chain

1,656,610

39.0%

84.3%

147.6%

$509

4,542,802

31.5%

92.8%

174.2%

$769

IRS/VITA/TCE

408,495

27.5%

76.6%

200.0%

$393

Other
Preparer
Other
Professional
Tax Preparer

641,660

37.6%

164.4%

305.0%

$881

5,905,418

38.7%

110.4%

195.4%

$976

Taxpayer

2,584,490

36.0%

64.1%

111.5%

$666

Total

16,944,452

1106

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

Figure 4

When the Total Tax analysis narrows to focus on legally
ambiguous Schedule C Form returns, as documented in
Table 4 and Figure 5, the compliance of returns filed by
CPAs/Attorneys and Enrolled Agents is, again, much better.
Here, the rate of returns with change and the change
amount from what was originally claimed are among the
lowest (more so for returns filed by CPAs/Attorneys than for
returns completed by Enrolled Agents), with the returns
prepared by IRS/VITA/TCE being most compliant.100
When limited to Schedule C Form returns, self-prepared
returns are most likely to have a change to Total Tax.101
Further, self-prepared Schedule C Form returns also
display the largest change to Total Tax as a percentage of
the original amount claimed (both net and among returns
with change).102 The Taxpayer category is followed by
100. After narrowing the Total Tax analysis to Schedule C Form returns,
IRS/VITA/TCE returns show 43% of returns with change to Total Tax; 25.6%
net change and 32.7% change among returns with change. See infra Table 4,
Figure 5.
101. See id. (showing the rate of returns with change in the Taxpayer
category at 72.8%).
102. See id. (showing 212.6% net change to Total Tax among returns with
change and 166.6% net change for self-prepared Schedule C Form returns).
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Friend/Relative and Large National Chain, both performing
less compliantly than with the general Total Tax analysis.103
The mode third most likely to file noncompliant returns in
this category is Other Professional Preparer.104
Table 4
Type of
Preparer

Weighted
Returns
With
Sched C

CPA/Attorney

291,801

32.5%

64.5%

Enrolled Agent

164,479

53.5%

66.4%

Friend/Relative
Large
National
Chain

213,033

12.9%

585,008

IRS/VITA/TCE
Other
Preparer
Other
Professional
Tax Preparer
Taxpayer
Total

% of
% of
Returns
Returns % Change
to Total
with a
with
Schedule C Change to Tax (Net)
Total Tax

% Change
to Total
Tax (Ret
w/change)

Weighted
Average
Change

69.5%

100.0%

$1010

78.8%

119.1%

$1387

69.3%

109.6%

189.3%

$852

12.9%

68.0%

98.8%

184.7%

$807

20,860

5.1%

43.0%

25.6%

32.7%

$418

69,813

10.9%

51.7%

48.2%

140.6%

$776

1,343,677

22.8%

67.7%

106.1%

155.5%

$1364

436,572

16.9%

72.8%

166.6%

212.6%

$1327

3,125,243

18.4%

103. See id.
104. See id. (showing, for example, the rate of change to Total Tax among
Schedule C Form returns at 67.7% for Other Professional Preparer, preceded by
the Taxpayer, Friend/Relative and Large National Chain returns at 72.8, 69.3
and 68% of returns with change, respectively. The Other Professional Preparer
category also has the third highest weighted average change to Total Tax for
Schedule C Form returns, at $1364).
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Figure 5

C. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
The analysis now turns to explore tax return
compliance on the line item of EITC, the provision that
generated the EITC Compliance Studies and database
analyzed in this Article.105 The results of the EITC findings
are documented in Table 5 and Figure 6. Here, the
CPA/Attorney (in particular), Large National Chain, and
IRS/VITA/TCE categories display the lowest percentage of
returns with change following IRS audit and review.106 The
results remain fairly consistent when looking at the rate of
change from claimed EITC, particularly the net change.107
These findings are in line with Holtzblatt and McCubbin,
105. See supra Introduction, pp. 1081-84 (discussing EITC Compliance Study
and subsequent creation of the EITC database).
106. The CPA/Attorney category shows 45.2% of returns with change to
EITC; Large National Chain shows 46.3% of returns with change to EITC; and
IRS/VITA/TCE exhibits 46.9% of returns with change to EITC. See infra Table
5, Figure 6.
107. See id. (showing 17.4% net change and 37% change to EITC among
returns with change for CPA/Attorney returns; 22.5% net change and 47.9%
change to EITC among returns with change for Large National Chain returns;
and 19.8% net change and 56.8% change to EITC among returns with change for
IRS/VITA/TCE returns).
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who concluded the 1999 overclaim rate among EITC
recipients using preparation services was 34.6%, while the
overclaim rate among self-preparing taxpayers was higher,
37.8%.108 Such evidence indicates a higher level of
compliance among taxpayers aided by preparers, as opposed
to taxpayers filing for themselves. According to Holtzblatt
and McCubbin, paid prepared returns were more compliant
than self-prepared returns, particularly when the preparer
was a greater trained and supervised Attorney, CPA,
Enrolled Agent, or other nationally recognized preparer.109
In these cases, the EITC overclaim rate was a low 25.2%,
compared with a 36.2 rate for all other types of preparers.110
Similarly, a study by Hite and Hasseldine analyzed
data from a random sample of 1997–1998 IRS office audits
to find that tax returns prepared with CPA assistance had
fewer audit adjustments and penalties than self-prepared
returns.111 CPA-prepared returns were also associated with
fewer audit adjustments than returns filed by other paid
preparers.112 These findings may offer evidence in contrast
with Erard, who suggested an increased rate of
noncompliance on CPA/Attorney prepared returns.113
Alternatively, CPAs and other well trained and regulated
preparers could be more compliant in certain problematic
filing circumstances, such as those involving Schedule C
Form returns, EITC, or office audits, which are more likely
to generate heightened IRS and public scrutiny.114
Despite increased scrutiny and IRS supervision, the
analysis reveals that the preparation mode of Enrolled
108. Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 57, at 170.
109. Id. at 171.
110. Id.
111. Office audits target those returns identified by the IRS as particularly
problematic. See Peggy A. Hite & John Hasseldine, Tax Practitioner Credentials
and the Incidence of IRS Audit Adjustments, ACCT. HORIZONS, 1, 7-13 (2003).
112. Id. at 7, 10, 12-13.
113. Erard, supra note 66, at 163, 191. Erard analyzed data that is already
three decades old. Id. at 164. Accordingly, it is possible his findings may be
outdated.
114. This argument suggests that certain problematic line items or return
types can pose a higher risk of detection and/or punishment for taxpayers. In
these cases, more sophisticated and better-trained preparers may be more likely
or capable to take proper care to avoid enforcement repercussions.
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Agent exhibits the highest rate of returns subject to change
in EITC, 71.6%.115 Returns filed by Enrolled Agents also
show the second highest rate of net change from EITC
originally claimed, 43.9%; the third highest change among
returns subject to change, 59.5%; and second highest
average weighted change, $1099.116
The analysis results for returns completed by preparers
who were previously unregulated add to the problematic
findings for Enrolled Agents. Specifically, the categories of
Other Preparer, Other Professional Preparer, and
Friend/Relative exhibit high rates of returns subject to
EITC change, at 58.5, 57, and 56.6%, respectively; Other
Preparer and Friend/Relative display the highest rates of
change to EITC among returns with change, 73.8 and
62.2%, respectively.117 These are followed by Enrolled Agent,
at 59.5%, and Other Professional Preparer, at 57.4%.118 The
preparer type with the highest weighted average change to
EITC originally claimed is Other Preparer, at $1199, with
Enrolled Agent, Other Professional Preparer, Large
National Chain, and Friend/Relative following closely
behind (at $1099, $983, $939, $919 respectively).119 The
preparer type of CPA/Attorney displays the lowest weighted
average change to EITC, only $497, with IRS/VITA/TCE
and the Taxpayer also showing relatively moderate changes
at $539 and $623, respectively.120

115. See infra Table 5, Figure 6.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See infra Table 5 (last column).
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Table 5
Weighted
Returns

% of
Returns
with
Change to
EITC

%
Change
from
Claimed
EITC
(Net)

% Change
from
Claimed
EITC (Ret
w/change)

Weighted
Average
Change

CPA/Attorney

897,341

45.2%

(17.4%)

(37.0%)

($497)

Enrolled Agent

307,637

71.6%

(43.9%)

(59.5%)

($1099)

Friend/Relative
Large National
Chain

1,656,610

56.6%

(35.4%)

(62.2%)

($919)

4,542,802

46.3%

(22.5%)

(47.9%)

($939)

IRS/VITA/TCE

408,495

46.9%

(19.8%)

(56.8%)

($539)

Other Preparer
Other
Professional Tax
Preparer

641,660

58.5%

(46.5%)

(73.8%)

($1199)

5,905,418

57.0%

(31.8%)

(57.4%)

($983)

Taxpayer

2,584,490

51.0%

(23.6%)

(46.3%)

($623)

Total

16,944,452

Type of Preparer
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Figure 6

Narrowing the EITC line item analysis to focus on
legally ambiguous Schedule C Form returns, as displayed in
Table 6 and Figure 7, Enrolled Agents still exhibit
problematic results, with the categories of Friend/Relative,
Other Professional Preparer, and Other Preparer following
closely behind. The preparation modes of IRS/VITA/TCE (in
particular), CPA/Attorney, and Large National Chain offer
the most accurate filing, as identified by IRS examiners.121
Compared with the line items of AGI122 and Total Tax,123
self-prepared returns are now not significantly less
compliant than returns other types of preparers file. The
Taxpayer results are between those categories that are most
121. See infra Table 6, Figure 7 (showing that IRS/VITA/TCE Schedule C
Form returns have 66.7% of returns with change to EITC, 3.8% net change and
27% change among returns with change from claimed EITC; CPA/Attorney
Schedule C Form returns have 71.1% of returns with change to EITC, 18.7% net
change and 30% change from claimed EITC among returns with change; Large
National Chain Schedule C Form returns have 73.1% of returns with change to
EITC, 15.7 net change and 22.2% change among returns with change to EITC.
The weighted average change is $76 for IRS/VITA/TCE, $370 for CPA/Attorney,
and $455 for Large National Chain).
122. See supra Table 2, Figure 3.
123. See supra Table 4, Figure 5.
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compliant in their EITC filings (IRS/VITA/TCE,
CPA/Attorney, and Large National Chain) and those that
have higher rates of change to EITC originally claimed
(Enrolled Agent, Friend/Relative, Other Professional
Preparer, and Other Preparer).124 The relative compliance of
self-prepared returns in this context could be attributed to
the complexity of EITC tax planning, which requires legal
and administrative skills many taxpayers may lack.
Alternatively, these results could emerge from taxpayer
efforts to make compliant, risk-free filing on this more
enforcement prone line item. In this context, generally only
the returns of the IRS/VITA/TCE, Large National Chain,
and CPA/Attorney categories are more compliant than selfprepared returns, with most categories indicating similarly
high rates of returns with change to EITC, yet varying on
the magnitude of change from EITC originally claimed.125
Table 6

Type of
Preparer

Weighted
Returns
With
Sched C

% of
Returns
with a
Schedule
C

% of
Returns
with
Change to
EITC

% Change
from
Claimed
EITC (Net)

% Change
from
Claimed
EITC (Ret
w/Change)

Weighted
Average
Change

CPA/Attorney
Enrolled
Agent

291,801

32.5%

71.1%

(18.7%)

(30.0%)

($370)

164,479

53.5%

74.5%

(47.1%)

(59.0%)

($1342)

Friend/Relative
Large
National
Chain

213,033

12.9%

78.7%

(29.5%)

(39.4%)

($655)

585,008

12.9%

73.1%

(15.7%)

(22.2%)

($455)

IRS/VITA/TCE
Other
Preparer
Other
Professional
Tax Preparer

20,860

5.1%

66.7%

3.8%

27.0%

$76

69,813

10.9%

78.7%

(30.3%)

(43.8%)

($886)

1,343,677

22.8%

74.9%

(33.1%)

(46.7%)

($814)

436,572

16.9%

78.5%

(25.8%)

(34.1%)

($538)

3,125,243

18.4%

Taxpayer
Total

124. See infra Table 6, Figure 7.
125. See id.
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Figure 7

D. Filing Status
Finally, the analysis considers the line item of filing
status. Unlike compliance with other line items explored in
this Article, determining the appropriate filing status of the
taxpayer is a fairly straightforward and legally
unambiguous task. It accordingly does not leave much room
for manipulation. The person completing the tax return
must follow a checklist of several key questions to conclude
whether the relevant taxpayer is entitled to claim the
advantageous Head of Household option, or another, less
beneficial, filing status.126 Accordingly, discrepancies on the
filing status line items can more easily be detected and
explained as filing errors resulting from lack of knowledge
126. The Head of Household filing status, as defined in Tax Year 1999, “is for
unmarried people who paid over half the cost of keeping up a home for a
qualifying person, such as a child or parent. Certain married people who lived
apart from their spouse for the last 6 months of 1999 may also be able to use
this status.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1999 1040 INSTRUCTIONS, 18 (1999),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1040gi--1999.pdf. The difference in
the standard deduction for a person filing as a Head of Household v. Single in
1999 was $2050 ($6350 vs. $4300). See id. at 2-3; see also EITC Statistics,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., available at http://www.eitc.irs.gov/central/eitcstats/
(Tax Year 1999).
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or due diligence, as opposed to sophisticated tax planning
behavior.
Figure 8 illustrates that while 21% of returns prepared
by Enrolled Agents claimed an incorrect filing status
generally, the rate more than doubles to 48.4% for returns
erroneously claiming the more beneficial Head of Household
status. This rise in mistaken election of Head of Household,
compared with other statuses, is also evident in the
CPA/Attorney and Taxpayer categories and, to a lesser
degree, across all other preparation types.127 Such a trend
could indicate rational gaming behavior across preparation
categories intended to reap the favorable financial
implications of the Head of Household filing status.
Exploring the rate of change in filing status generally,
the CPA/Attorney and Taxpayer categories exhibit the most
compliant tax returns, with 11.4 and 16.9% change rate,
respectively. These results illustrate fairly compliant filing
patterns in returns prepared by the Taxpayer and
CPAs/Attorneys when the law is relatively clear and simple
to apply. Consistent with other results detailed in this
Article, returns filed by Other Preparers, Other Professional
Preparers, and Friends/Relatives perform most poorly, with
change rates about double those of the CPA/Attorney and
Taxpayer categories: 37.6, 30.7, and 29.9%, respectively.
However, these high rates of mistakenly-elected filing
status by Other Preparers, Other Professional Preparers,
and Relatives/Friends are not motivated by clear financial
incentives, compared with the Head of Household status.
Accordingly, they could indicate, for example, lower levels of
preparation skills, due diligence, or even misguided
taxpayer information rather than intentional tax planning
behavior.
Examining returns originally claiming the more
advantageous Head of Household status, the preparation
mode of Other Preparer still displays the highest rate of
change compared with other preparation types (56.6%),
with CPA/Attorney-prepared returns being most compliant,
at 23.6% change.128 The returns of taxpayers filing for
themselves remain fairly compliant as well, with a 30.3%
change rate. Enrolled Agent returns display the second
127. See infra Figure 8, Appendix D.
128. See id.
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least compliant findings, with 48.4% change. This is closely
followed by returns filed by Friends/Relatives and Other
Professional Preparers, at 46.3 and 46.2% change,
respectively.129
Figure 8

V. DISCUSSION
Taking the above analysis into full view, several
compliance patterns emerge among returns submitted by
different categories of preparers. Particularly, there are
indications of different filing behaviors among better
trained and regulated preparers (especially CPAs/Attorneys
and IRS/VITA/TCE); preparers who generally operated
under the regulatory radar until the 2011 preparer
regulation (particularly Other Preparers and Other
Professional Preparers); and Taxpayers filing for
themselves. Among these different groups of preparers, the
categories of Friend/Relative, Enrolled Agent, and Large
National Chain provide less clear-cut but nonetheless
interesting results.

129. See id.
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A. IRS/VITA/TCE and CPAs/Attorneys
The data analysis section of this Article suggests that,
compared with other preparer types, IRS/VITA/TCE and
CPAs/Attorneys generate some of the most compliant tax
return filings, the former generally more than the latter.
The main exception concerns Filing Status, in which
CPA/Attorney returns perform notably better than
IRS/VITA/TCE.130 More specifically, the IRS/VITA/TCE
category generates more compliant returns than other
preparation modes on almost every line item explored.
While the AGI line item indicates a relatively high rate of
returns with change after IRS audit and review, the
magnitude of change (both net and among returns with
change) is lowest in the IRS/VITA/TCE category, as well as
the weighted average change.131 When narrowing the AGI
analysis to focus on Schedule C Form returns,
IRS/VITA/TCE returns are still most compliant, this time
on all parameters explored.132 IRS/VITA/TCE returns also
indicate the lowest rate of returns with change and lowest
weighted average change to Total Tax.133 A rather high
(200%) adjustment to Total Tax among returns with change
could be attributed to the relatively low weighted average
change in this category.134
Likewise, in the Total Tax analysis narrowed to
Schedule C Form returns, IRS/VITA/TCE returns are once
more most compliant on all parameters explored.135

130. See infra Figure 8; infra Appendix D (showing CPA/Attorney returns
with 11.4% change rate in filing status generally and 23.6% change rate from
the Head of Household status; IRS/VITA/TCE returns have 22.2% change rate
in filing status generally and 32.5% change rate from the Head of Household
status).
131. See supra Table 1, Figure 1 (showing 6.4% net change and 15.1% change
among returns with change to AGI in the IRS/VITA/TCE category. The
weighted average change is $1439).
132. See supra Table 2, Figure 3.
133. See supra Table 3, Figure 4 (showing 27.5% of returns with change to
Total Tax in the IRS/VITA/TCE category and $393 weighted average change
after IRS audit and review).
134. See supra Table 3 (last two columns).
135. See supra Table 4, Figure 5 (showing 43% of Schedule C Form returns
with change to Total Tax in the IRS/VITA/TCE category, 25.6% net change,
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IRS/VITA/TCE returns also perform well on the EITC line
item, with only returns submitted by CPAs/Attorneys
displaying better results and Large National Chain returns
following closely behind.136 Narrowing the EITC analysis to
focus on Schedule C Form returns, the returns filed by
IRS/VITA/TCE are again most compliant.137 Notably, when
examining the Filing Status line item, the returns of
CPA/Attorney, Taxpayer, and Enrolled Agent perform
better on the change rate generally, while only the
CPA/Attorney
and
Taxpayer
categories
surpass
IRS/VITA/TCE’s compliance on the change rate from the
more advantageous Head of Household status.138
Although CPA/Attorney returns indicate particularly
high rates of returns with change to the AGI139 and, to a
lesser extent, Total Tax,140 once accounting for the higher
rate of Schedule C Form returns in the CPA/Attorney
category,141 filing results appear significantly more
32.7% change among returns with change and $418 weighted average change
after IRS audit and review).
136. See supra Table 5, Figure 6 (showing, for example, the rate of returns
with change to EITC at 46.9% for IRS/VITA/TCE, 46.3% for Large National
Chain, and 45.2% for CPA/Attorney. The magnitude of change to EITC—both
net and among returns with change—is: 17.4 and 37% for CPA/Attorney,
respectively; 19.8 and 56.8% for IRS/VITA/TCE, respectively; and 22.5 and
47.9% for Large National Chain, respectively. The weighted average change to
EITC is $497 for CPA/Attorney, $539 for IRS/VITA/TCE and $939 for Large
National Chain).
137. See supra Table 6, Figure 7 (showing 66.7% of Schedule C Form returns
with change to EITC in the IRS/VITA/TCE category; 3.8% net change; 27%
change among returns with change; and $76 weighted average change after IRS
audit and review).
138. See supra Figure 8, infra appendix D (showing the change rate in filing
status generally at 22.2% for IRS/VITA/TCE and at 32.5% from the Head of
Household status).
139. See supra Table 1, Figure 1 (showing 49.2% of returns with change to
AGI in the CPA/Attorney category).
140. See supra Table 3, Figure 4 (showing 46.7% of returns with change to
Total Tax in the CPA/Attorney category).
141. See supra Figure 2 (showing 32.5% of CPA/Attorney returns are
Schedule C Form returns. In contrast, only 12.9% of the returns filed by
Friends/Relatives and Large National Chains are Schedule C Form returns,
while IRS/VITA/TCE returns include 5.1% Schedule C Form returns and the
Taxpayer 16.9%).
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compliant. The results for CPA/Attorney returns are only
second to those of IRS/VITA/TCE and Large National Chain
in the AGI line item;142 and IRS/VITA/TCE and, to some
extent, Other Preparer for Total Tax.143 Accordingly,
accounting for its higher incidences of legally ambiguous
filing circumstances, the CPA/Attorney category does not
show less compliant returns and, in fact, performs more
compliantly than most other preparation types.
Further, the magnitude of change in the Total Tax
analysis generally, but not for the AGI line item, is among
the lowest for CPAs/Attorneys.144 Returns submitted by
CPAs/Attorneys are also among the most compliant when
exploring the EITC line item, displaying the lowest rate of
returns with change, lowest rate of change (both net as well
as among returns with change), and lowest weighted
average change.145 Results for the EITC analysis narrowed
to Schedule C Form returns remain rather compliant, albeit
now preceded by IRS/VITA/TCE and Large National
Chains.146 On the Filing Status line item, CPA/Attorney
prepared returns illustrate the smallest change rate
generally, as well as from Head of Household status.147

142. See supra Table 2, Figure 3.
143. See supra Table 4, Figure 5.
144. See supra Table 3, Figure 4 (showing 71.2% net change and 118.3%
change among returns with change to Total Tax in the CPA/Attorney category);
Table 1, Figure 1 (showing 14.2% net change and 32.2% change among returns
with change to AGI in the CPA/Attorney category).
145. See supra Table 5, Figure 6 (showing 45.2% of returns with change to
EITC in the CPA/Attorney category, 17.4% net change, 37% change among
returns with change and $497 weighted average change after IRS audit and
review).
146. See supra Table 6, Figure 7 (showing, for example, the magnitude of
change to EITC among Schedule C Form returns at 3.8% net change and 27%
change among returns with change for IRS/VITA/TCE; at 15.7% net change and
22.2% change among returns with change for Large National Chains; and at
18.7% net change and 30% change among returns with change for
CPAs/Attorneys).
147. See supra Figure 8; infra Appendix D (showing 11.4% change in filing
status generally and 23.6% change from the Head of Household status for
CPAs/Attorneys).
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B. Other Preparers and Other Professional Preparers
Compared with CPAs/Attorneys and IRS/VITA/TCE,
which consistently file relatively compliant returns, Other
Preparers and Other Professional Preparers are on the
lower end of compliance. These preparers file returns that
more often indicate greater incidences and scope of
adjustments after IRS audit and review. Specifically, the
returns filed by Other Preparers and Other Professional
Preparers exhibit lower compliance on the AGI and EITC
line items, both generally148 and when focusing on Schedule
C Form returns.149 When exploring the AGI line item, Other
Preparer returns show the second and first highest
magnitude of adjustment after IRS audit and review (net
and among returns with change, in that order), while
returns Other Professional Preparers file have the fourth
and second highest rates of change.150 These two categories
also display the highest and third highest weighted average
change.151
148. See supra Table 1, Figure 1 (showing, for example, 14.7 net change to
AGI and 36.6% change among returns with change for Other Preparers; and
13.4% net change to AGI and 33.5% change among returns with change for
Other Professional Preparers); Table 5, Figure 6 (showing, for example, 46.5%
net change to EITC and 73.8% change among returns with change for Other
Preparers; and 31.8% net change to EITC and 57.4% change among returns
with change for Other Professional Preparers).
149. See supra Table 2, Figure 3 (showing, for example, 25% net change to
AGI in Schedule C Form returns and 39.2% change among returns with change
for Other preparers; and 37.5% net change to AGI in Schedule C Form returns
and 52.3% change among returns with change for Other Professional
Preparers); Table 6, Figure 7 (showing, for example, 30.3% net change to EITC
in Schedule C Form returns and 43.8% change among returns with change for
Other Preparers; and 33.1% net change to EITC in Schedule C Form returns
and 46.7% change among returns with change for Other Professional
Preparers).
150. See supra Table 1, Figure 1.
151. See id. (showing $4506 weighted average change to AGI for Other
Preparers and $3990 weighted average change to AGI for Other Professional
Preparers). When narrowing the AGI analysis to Schedule C Form returns, the
returns Other Preparers and Other Professional Preparers file still generate
disconcerting results. Returns of Other Preparers show the highest rate of
returns with change (tied with Friends/Relatives); the fourth highest net
change; the third highest change rate among returns with change; and the
fourth highest weighted average change. See supra Table 2, Figure 3. Similarly,
returns Other Professional Preparers complete indicate the third highest rate of
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The results for Other Preparers and Other Professional
Preparers in the Total Tax analysis are also among the least
compliant.152 This is especially true when narrowing the
analysis to Schedule C Form returns in the Other
Professional Preparer category.153 In analyzing EITC, Other
Preparer and Other Professional Preparer returns again
display some of the least compliant findings both
generally154 and when focusing on Schedule C Form
returns.155 Finally, Filing Status results are also highly
problematic: Other Preparer returns indicate the highest
change rate—both generally and from Head of Household
status—while Other Professional Preparer returns show the
second highest change rate from Filing Status generally and
fourth highest change rate from Head of Household
status.156
returns with change; the highest magnitude of change (both net and among
returns with change); and the second highest weighted average change. See id.
152. See supra Table 3, Figure 4 (showing that while returns of Other
Preparers and Other Professional Preparers display the fifth and fourth highest
rates of returns with change to Total Tax—at 38.7% and 37.6%, respectively—
both categories perform worse on the magnitude of change. Other Preparer
returns display the highest rate of change to Total Tax, both net and among
returns with change—at 164.4% net change and 305% change among returns
with change—and third highest weighted average change, at $881. Other
Professional Preparer returns show second highest net change and average
weighted change, at 110.4% and $976, respectively. Returns filed by Other
Professional Preparers also have the third highest rate of change among returns
with change, at 195.4%).
153. See supra Table 4, Figure 5.
154. See supra Table 5, Figure 6 (showing that the returns filed by Other
Preparers have the second highest rate of returns with change, at 58.5%, and
the highest magnitude of change, both net and among returns with change, at
46.5% and 73.8%, respectively. Other Preparer returns also show the highest
weighted average change to EITC, at $1199. Returns of Other Professional
Preparers have the third highest rate of returns with change, at 57%, net
change and weighted average change, at 57.4% and $983, respectively. Returns
filed by Other Professional Preparers also show fourth highest change rate
among returns with change, at 31.8%).
155. See supra Table 6, Figure 7 (showing, for example, that in the EITC
analysis narrowed to Schedule C Form returns, Other Professional Preparer
returns display the second highest magnitude of change, both net and among
returns with change, at 31.1 and 46.7%, respectively, and third highest
weighted average change, at $814).
156. See supra Figure 8; infra Appendix D.
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C. Enrolled Agents
Some of the more interesting results of the analysis
concern Enrolled Agent returns. Enrolled Agents, the only
taxpayer representative to receive its authorization to
practice from the IRS at the time of this study,157
occasionally generate among the most problematic filing
results. Specifically, Enrolled Agent returns show some of
the least compliant findings on the AGI line item, with the
highest rate of returns with change to AGI and net change
from AGI originally claimed.158 Unlike the CPA/Attorney
category, when the analysis narrows to focus on the legally
ambiguous Schedule C Form returns, Enrolled Agents still
yield some of the most problematic findings, including the
highest weighted average change and second highest rate of
change, both net and among returns with change.159 Here,
only Other Preparer and Other Professional Preparer
returns perform worse on compliance (the latter more than
the former) with the results for self-prepared returns
following closely behind.160
The Total Tax analysis is somewhat less clear: Enrolled
Agent returns display the highest rate of returns with
change and the highest weighted average change; but third
and second lowest magnitude of change, net and among
returns with change, respectively.161 Focusing on Schedule C
Form returns, Enrolled Agent returns yield slightly better
results: they now fall in the middle of the compliance scale
compared with other preparer types.162 However, Enrolled
157. See supra note 41.
158. See supra Table 1 (showing 61% of returns with change to AGI and
15.4% net change for Enrolled Agent returns).
159. See supra Table 2, Figure 3 (showing the weighted average change to
AGI in Schedule C Form returns of Enrolled Agents at $6035, and the net
change and change among returns with change at 32 and 44.5%, respectively).
160. See id.
161. See supra Table 3, Figure 4 (showing that the rate of change to Total
Tax in the Enrolled Agent category at 57.4%, and net change and change rate
among returns with change at 73.7 and 112%, respectively. The weighted
average change to Total Tax in the Enrolled Agent category is the highest, at
$1003).
162. When focusing on Schedule C Form returns, Enrolled Agents show the
fourth lowest rate of returns with change and net change to Total Tax and third
lowest rate of change among returns with change. See supra Table 4, Figure 5.
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Agent returns show some of the worst compliance results in
the EITC line item, especially when focusing on Schedule C
Form returns.163
While remaining more compliant than several other
preparation modes, compliance on the Filing Status line
item in Enrolled Agent returns is, again, not very good.
Enrolled Agent returns exhibit the third lowest rate of
change from Filing Status generally, but the second highest
rate of change from the more advantageous Head of
Household status, preceded only by Other Preparer.164
D. Taxpayer: Self-Preparation
Self-prepared returns are unique in that they exhibit
some of the most compliant findings on the one hand, while
also displaying among the least arguable results on the
other. Specifically, when exploring line items generally and
without focusing on the legally ambiguous Schedule C Form
returns, the Taxpayer category tends to generate compliant
returns. This is more so in the Total Tax than the AGI line
item. For example, self-prepared returns indicate the second
lowest rate of returns with change to AGI.165 The rate of
change, both net and among returns with change, is also
among the lowest, although the weighted average change to
AGI is not insignificant.166
On the Total Tax line item, self-prepared returns show
the third lowest rate of returns with change, preceded by

163. See supra Table 5, Figure 6 (showing, for example, the highest rate of
returns with change to EITC, at 71.6%, and second highest weighted average
change, at $1099 for Enrolled Agents); Table 6, Figure 7 (showing, for example,
the highest magnitude of change to EITC among Schedule C Form returns, both
net and among returns with change, for Enrolled Agents, at 47.1 and 59%,
respectively. Enrolled Agent Schedule C Form returns also show the highest
weighted average change to EITC, at $1342).
164. See supra Figure 8; infra Appendix D (showing 21% change rate in filing
status generally for Enrolled Agents and 48.4% change rate from the Head of
Household status).
165. See supra Table 1, Figure 1 (showing the rate of returns with change to
AGI for the Taxpayer at 34.4%).
166. See id. (showing the net change to AGI in the Taxpayer category at
8.6%, the rate of change to AGI among returns with change at 23.7%, and the
weighted average change to AGI in the Taxpayer category at $3444).
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IRS/VITA/TCE and Large National Chain.167 The magnitude
of change, both net and among returns with change to Total
Tax, is the lowest, followed by CPAs/Attorneys and Enrolled
Agents, with a relatively low weighted average change as
well.168
Notably, once focusing on the legally ambiguous
Schedule C Form returns, self-prepared returns are
significantly less compliant: the results are worse on all
parameters explored, especially in the Total Tax line item.169
When the AGI analysis narrows to Schedule C Form
returns, the Taxpayer category exhibits some of the highest
rates of returns with change.170 The Taxpayer rate of change
is lower only marginally than the rate of change of Other
Preparers and Friends/Relatives, which file the least
compliant returns.171 The Taxpayer category also has the
third highest net change and weighted average change.172
However, the magnitude of change among returns with
change is not significantly worse in the Taxpayer category
than other preparer modes, with Other Professional
Preparer, Enrolled Agent, and Other Preparer returns filing
less compliant returns.173 Exploring Total Tax among
Schedule C Form returns, self-prepared returns again
indicate the highest rate of returns with change, the highest
magnitude of change—both net and among returns with
167. See supra Table 3, Figure 4 (showing the rate of returns with change to
Total Tax in the Taxpayer category at 36%, while the rates of returns with
change to Total Tax in the IRS/VITA/TCE and Large National Chains are 27.5
and 31.5%, respectively).
168. See id. (showing the weighted average change to Total Tax in the
taxpayer category at $666, preceded by IRS/VITA/TCE at $393 and
Friends/Relatives at $509).
169. See supra Table 4, Figure 5 (showing, for example, that only Enrolled
Agent and Other Professional Preparer returns generate greater adjustments in
the weighted average change to Total Tax).
170. See supra Table 2, Figure 3 (showing the rate of returns with change to
AGI in the AGI narrowed to Schedule C Form returns analysis at 78.5% for selfprepared returns, preceded only by Other Preparer and Friend/Relative returns
at 78.7%).
171. See id.
172. See id. (showing the net change to AGI among Schedule C Form returns
in the Taxpayer category at 28.8%, while the weighted average change is
$5248).
173. See id.
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change—and, by a margin, the third highest weighted
average change (preceded by returns filed by Enrolled
Agents and Other Professional Preparers).174
On the EITC line item, the Taxpayer category generates
fairly compliant results, even when focusing on Schedule C
Form returns.175 However, compared with other preparer
types, the results in the Taxpayer category are not most
compliant
and
generally
rank
below
those
of
CPAs/Attorneys,
Large
National
Chains,
and
IRS/VITA/TCE (not necessarily in that order).176 Selfprepared returns also indicate the second lowest change
rate, both generally and from the Head of Household status,
on the legally clear-cut Filing Status line item (second only
to the returns filed by CPAs/Attorneys).177
E. Large National Chains
The returns submitted by the preparer type of Large
National Chain, while not the most compliant, indicate
rather compliant patterns generally. This is particularly the
case with regard to AGI and EITC, where returns filed by
Large National Chains exhibit some of the most compliant
174. See supra Table 4, Figure 5 (showing the rate of returns with change to
Total Tax among Schedule C Form returns in the Taxpayer category at 72.8%,
the net change at 106.1%, and the rate of change among returns with change at
155.5%. The weighted average change to Total Tax among Schedule C Form
returns in the Taxpayer category is $1327).
175. See supra Table 5, Figure 6 (showing, for example, the rate of returns
with change to EITC in the Taxpayer category to be second lowest, at 46.3%,
and the weighted average change third lowest, at $623); Table 6, Figure 7
(showing, for example, the rate of returns with change to EITC among Schedule
C Form returns and the weighted average change in the Taxpayer category to
be fourth lowest, at 34.1% and $538, respectively).
176. On the EITC line item, the rate of returns with change in the Taxpayer
category does not differ much from other preparation categories, with the
magnitude of change (net and among returns with change) and the weighted
average change among the lowest. See supra Table 5, Figure 6. When narrowing
the EITC analysis to Schedule C Form returns, the magnitude of change (both
net and among returns with change) is again comfortably in the middle of the
compliance scale (proceeded by IRS/VITA/TCE, Large National Chains, and
CPAs/Attorneys). See supra Table 6, Figure 7.
177. See supra Figure 8; infra Appendix D (showing the change rate in filing
status generally for the Taxpayer at 16.9% and at 30.3% from the Head of
Household status).
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results, generally preceded only by IRS/VITA/TCE and
CPAs/Attorneys.178 However, more problematic patterns
emerge in the Total Tax and Filing Status analysis: Large
National Chain returns are less complaint, but are still
generally more compliant than returns submitted by Other
Preparers, Other Professional Preparers, Friends/Relatives,
and, at times, Enrolled Agents.179 Specifically, in the AGI
analysis, Large National Chains display the third lowest
rate of returns with change.180 Returns filed by Large
National Chains show the second lowest magnitude of
change, both net and among returns with change, and
second lowest weighted average change.181 Narrowing the
AGI analysis to focus on Schedule C Form returns, Large
National Chains still display results that are relatively
compliant.182
When considering the Total Tax line item, Large
National Chain returns appear less compliant than in the
AGI analysis, with results that fall in the middle of the
compliance scale compared with other preparer types. For
example, while Large National Chain returns indicate the
second lowest rate of returns with change to Total Tax
(second only to IRS/VITA/TCE), they show the third highest
rate of net change, fourth highest rate of change among

178. See supra Table 1, Figure 1 (showing, for example, the second lowest net
change and rate of change among returns with change to AGI for Large
National Chains, at 6.9 and 19.8%, respectively); Table 5, Figure 6 (showing, for
example, the third lowest net change and rate of change among returns with
change to EITC for Large National Chains, at 22.5 and 47.9%, respectively).
179. See supra Table 3, Figure 4 (showing, for example, the second lowest
rate of returns with change to Total Tax for Large National Chains, at 31.5%.
Large National Chains, however, have the third and fourth highest net change
and rate of change among returns with change to Total Tax, at 92.8 and 174.2%,
respectively); Figure 8 (showing, for example, the forth highest and forth lowest
rates of change in filing status generally and from the Head of Household status
for Large National Chains, at 24.7 and 34.5%, respectively).
180. See supra Table 1, Figure 1 (showing the rate of returns with change to
AGI for Large National Chains at 37.5%, preceded by Friends/Relatives at
31.1% and the Taxpayer, at 34.4% of returns with change to AGI).
181. See id.
182. See supra Table 2, Figure 3 (showing, for example, the third lowest net
change and average weighted change to AGI among Schedule C Form returns
for Large National Chains, at 22.2% and $3614 respectively).
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returns with change, and fourth lowest weighted average
change.183
Large National Chain returns are again much more
compliant on the EITC line item, both before and after
focusing on Schedule C Form returns. The category of Large
National Chain displays the second lowest rate of returns
with change to EITC; and the second and third lowest
magnitude of change, among returns with change and net
change, respectively.184 However, the results for Large
National Chain returns are not very compliant on the Filing
Status line item: here, Large National Chain returns fall in
the middle of the compliance scale compared with other
preparer types.185 Large National Chain returns exhibit, for
example, the fourth highest (or fifth lowest) change rate in
Filing Status generally and fourth lowest (or fifth highest)
change rate from the more beneficial Head of Household
status.186
F. Friends/Relatives of the Taxpayer
Similar to Large National Chains, the returns filed by
Friends/Relatives of the taxpayer generally do not exhibit
the least compliant results. However, even more than Large
183. See supra Table 3, Figure 4. Narrowing the Total Tax analysis to
Schedule C Form returns does not change the results much. Large National
Chain returns now display the third highest rate of returns with change
(preceded by the Taxpayer and Friends/Relatives), the fourth highest rate of net
change (preceded by the Taxpayer, Friends/Relatives and Other Professional
Preparers), the third highest rate of change among returns with change
(preceded by the Taxpayer and Friends/Relatives) and third lowest weighted
average change (preceded by IRS/VITA/TCE and Other Preparers). See supra
Table 4, Figure 5.
184. See supra Table 5, Figure 6. However, the weighted average change in
the EITC analysis is not insignificant; it ranks fourth highest compared with
other preparer categories (preceded by Other Preparers, Enrolled Agents and
Other Professional Preparers). Results for EITC narrowed to Schedule C Form
returns for Large National Chains remain rather compliant. Large National
Chain returns show the second lowest net change and lowest rate of change
among returns with change, at 15.7 and 22.2%, respectively. See supra Table 6,
Figure 7. Large National Chain returns also show the third lowest weighted
average change, at $455. See id.
185. See supra Figure 8; infra Appendix D.
186. See id. (showing the change rate in filing status generally for Large
National Chains at 24.7%, and from the Head of Household status at 34.5%).
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National Chains, the Friend/Relative category tends to fall
on the lower end of compliance. Friend/Relative returns
display particularly problematic results when focusing on
Schedule C Form returns, but are also consistently less
compliant on the EITC and the legally simpler Filing Status
line items. Specifically, while Friend/Relative filings show
the lowest rate of returns with change to AGI, the
magnitude of change and weighted average change are
ranked the third lowest compared with other preparer
types.187 These results do not change significantly when
exploring Schedule C Form returns, except that the rate of
returns with change in the Friend/Relative category is now
tied for the highest with Other Preparers.188
When considering the Total Tax line item,
Relative/Friend returns indicate the third highest rate of
returns with change, preceded only by Enrolled Agents and
CPAs/Attorneys,189 both of which prepare a larger share of
legally ambiguous Schedule C Form and itemized deduction
returns.190 Friend/Relative returns also indicate the fourth
highest and fifth lowest magnitude of change, both net and
among returns with change, respectively, but only the
second lowest weighted average change.191 When focusing on
Schedule C Form returns, the Relative/Friend category
indicates worse compliance results yet again, with the

187. See supra Table 1, Figure 1 (showing the rate of returns with change to
AGI in the Friend/Relative category at 31.1%, the rate of change among returns
with change to AGI at 24.3% and weighted average change at $2742).
188. See supra Table 2, Figure 3 (showing the rate of returns with change in
the AGI analysis narrowed to Schedule C Form returns at 78.7% for
Friends/Relatives).
189. See supra Table 3, Figure 4 (showing the rate of returns with change to
Total Tax for the Friend/Relative category at 39%, preceded by Enrolled Agents
at 57.4%, and CPAs/Attorneys at 46.7% of returns with change to Total Tax).
190. See supra Figure 2; infra Appendix C (showing that Friend/Relative
returns include 12.9% Schedule C Form returns, while the share of Schedule C
Form returns filed by CPAs/Attorneys and Enrolled Agents is 32.5 and 53.5%,
respectively).
191. See supra Table 3, Figure 4 (showing the weighted average change to
Total Tax in the Friend/Relative category at $509, second only to IRS/VITA/TCE
at $393).
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second highest rate of returns with change and magnitude
of change, net and among returns with change.192
As with other line items in this category, the results for
EITC are consistently not very compliant, but also are not
least compliant compared with other preparer types.
Friend/Relative returns indicate the fourth highest rate of
returns with change and fourth lowest weighted average
change to EITC originally claimed.193 The magnitude of
change to EITC is the third and second highest, net and
among returns with change, respectively.194 Similar results
emerge when focusing on Schedule C Form returns, within
the EITC line item analysis,195 as well as the Filing Status
line item.196
G. Caveats and Policy Inferences
Three decades ago, Kidder and McEwen theorized that
two broad types of tax professionals exist: professionals who
facilitate taxpayer compliance and those who are more
likely to be associated with noncompliance.197 More recently,
Sakurai and Braithwaite drew from a 2000 nationwide
192. See supra Table 4, Figure 5. One possible explanation for this result is
that lower preparation skills on the Friend/Relative end lead to tax filing errors
that are not in the taxpayer’s favor (financially or otherwise). Alternatively, if
the taxpayer whose return is filed initially has lower income, the financial
implication of errors identified by the IRS examiner may not be large compared
with those made on the returns of taxpayer aided by other preparers. Note that
compared with the AGI narrowed to Schedule C Form returns analysis, this
time the weighted average change in the Friend/Relative category is not among
the highest. Rather, the weighted average change is fourth lowest compared
with other preparation modes. Id.
193. See supra Table 5, Figure 6.
194. See id.
195. Here, Friend/Relative returns show the fourth highest magnitude of
change (net and among returns with change) and weighted average change to
EITC originally claimed. See supra Table 6, Figure 7.
196. See supra Figure 8; infra Appendix D (showing that Friend/Relative
returns have the third highest rate of change in filing status, both generally and
from Head of Household status at 29.9 and 46.3%, respectively).
197. Robert Kidder & Craig McEwen, Taxpaying Behavior in Social Context:
A Tentative Typology of Tax Compliance and Noncompliance, 2 TAXPAYER
COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 47, 69-72 (Jeffery Roth et al. eds.,
1989).
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survey of Australian taxpayers and placed tax advisors on a
hypothetical compliance scale based on their inclination to
facilitate taxpayer noncompliance, as opposed to more
accurate and conservative tax reporting.198 Building on these
studies, the empirical analysis undertaken in this Article
indicates that some compliance patterns are more likely for
certain types of preparers than others.
Specifically, most of the compliance findings detailed in
this Article differ for professionally regulated and trained
preparers and those that, at the time the data used for this
Article was drawn, operated outside the reach of the tax
administration. In particular, returns Other Preparers and
Other Professional Preparers file consistently exhibit poor
compliance results.199 In contrast, the categories of
CPA/Attorney and IRS/VITA/TCE, both of which subscribe
to clearer and professionally heightened regulatory
standards, display some of the most compliant filings.200
That being said, the available data is still far from
suggesting well-defined compliance trends for preparer
filings across the board. Surprisingly, Enrolled Agents, the
only taxpayer representatives directly regulated and
supervised by the IRS at the time of this study, exhibit
rather unfortunate findings, at times displaying the least
compliant results.201 Additionally, Large National Chains,
which were mainly held to guild-regulated norms and
oversight until the 2011 preparer regulation,202 perform
rather well, in many cases surpassing the compliance of
Enrolled Agent returns.203

198. Sakurai & Braithwaite, supra note 28, at 375, 384-85 (suggesting that,
on one end of the compliance scale are professionals who are honest and riskadverse, and those who are creative and aggressive on the other. A third group,
in the middle, includes cautious tax minimizers. Sakurai & Braithwaite argue
that even though the aggressive advisor type is the least popular in terms of
taxpayer preference, it is of a particular concern for the tax authority).
199. See supra Part V.B (discussing Other Preparers and Other Professional
Preparers).
200. See supra Part V.A (discussing IRS/VITA/TCE and CPAs/Attorneys).
201. See supra Part V.C (discussing Enrolled Agents).
202. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text (discussing preparer
oversight prior to the 2011 preparer regulation).
203. See supra Part V.E (discussing Large National Chains).
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However, no study is without its qualifications,
especially for an empirical undertaking. The analysis in this
Article is of no exception. One key qualification is the
limited amount of data available for the analysis and the
fact that it is restricted to the EITC population. Given these
restrictions, it becomes empirically tenuous to conclusively
establish specific compliance traits for different types of
preparers. First and foremost, like previous scholarship in
this area, the analysis undertaken here does not prove
whether the instigator of tax noncompliance is the taxpayer
or, rather, the preparer. Errors identified on returns filed by
someone other than the taxpayer do not necessarily mean
they are the result of preparer’s misconduct. In advising
clients and completing returns on their behalf, preparers
must rely on the information their clients provide.204 If this
information is incomplete or incorrect, the returns
preparers file will not reflect the taxpayer’s true tax
liability.205
Further, the analysis carried out in this Article relies on
IRS audit and review to establish whether information
reported on tax returns is compliant. At times, however,
what the IRS may interpret as noncompliance may more
accurately be defined as a difference of opinions—between
the taxpayer or preparer and the IRS examiner—about the
tax law and its application. Moreover, IRS examiners may
be reluctant to challenge the judgment of the preparer in
some cases, such as those involving CPAs and Attorneys, as
204. James Tackett et al., Profiling Fictitious Tax Data, 116 TAX NOTES 953,
954 (2007).
205. Id. At times, some indicators may point to who is leading the taxpayerpreparer relationship and, accordingly, possible acts of noncompliance. For
example, some adjustments on returns made after IRS audit and review can
suggest more advanced tax planning skills and knowledge. In such cases, tax
preparers are more likely to be the cause, or at least facilitators, of
noncompliance, compared with the taxpayer. An example of this could be
incorrectly claiming Head of Household filling status. On the other end, errors
identified on tax returns that show no financial gain to the taxpayer (or cost the
taxpayer an increased liability) could indicate lower preparation skills,
negligence, or innocent mistakes, as opposed to aggressive tax planning
activities. An example of this could be incorrectly claiming a filing status other
than the Head of Household when Head of Household status is applicable.
However, existing data offers no reliable method to identify whether such tax
filing errors are intentional efforts to exploit the law or, rather, the result of
confusion and innocent mistakes in its application.
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opposed to other preparers, such as friends and relatives of
the taxpayer, who lack an authoritative (i.e., professional)
stance. This could be the case, particularly, in legally
ambiguous filing circumstances where the application of the
law is unclear. Accordingly, what may appear as
noncompliance in the analysis may in fact reflect an
inherent bias in the database. However, as most tax audits
end with IRS judgment (compared, for example, with court
rulings), no better alternative for readily assessing tax
return compliance is currently available.
One of the valuable insights the Sakurai and
Braithwaite analysis offers is that taxpayers are inclined to
seek out advisors who share their views on compliance.206
This thesis is consistent with Karlinsky and Bankman, who
find that sole proprietors interested in minimizing their tax
liability turn to tax professionals who may facilitate such
aspirations.207 In this view, more compliance- or
noncompliance-motivated taxpayers are likely to reach out
to preparers who they believe are in a position to advance
their tax planning inclination. This proposition, as well as
the challenges in identifying the instigator(s) of
noncompliance, clarify that the taxpayer and preparer
arrive at the tax filing platform as one interconnected unit.
Accordingly, an effective approach to better
understanding and enhancing taxpayer compliance is not
necessarily the traditional two-player metric, where the tax
administration and the taxpayer are the sole, or even key,
parties.208 Rather, what is at issue is a three-player game. In
this game, the taxpayer, preparer, and tax administration
are initially positioned on a level playing field.209 However,
the regulatory scene that existed prior to August 2011—
where some preparers were able to operate outside the
206. Sakurai & Braithwaite, supra note 28, at 375-76.
207. Stuart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Developing a Theory of Cash
Businesses Tax Evasion Behavior and the Role of their Tax Preparers, THE 5TH
INT’L CONF. ON TAX ADMIN. PROC. 164 (2002).
208. For the leading piece originating much of the modern economic analysis
of tax compliance, see Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax
Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972) (adapting Gary
Becker’s economic analysis of crime and compliance to the area of tax).
209. For studies advancing the three-player proposition see, for example,
Cuccia, supra note 69, at 42-43 and Klepper & Nagin, supra note 80, at 168-69
(1989).
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reach of the tax administration—set the stage for the
administration to serve the role of the third, disadvantaged
wheel. Read in this light, the heightened scrutiny and
regulatory standards of the new preparer regulation can be
a boon to tax compliance. As the relationship between the
tax administration and preparers becomes closely knit and
better regulated, more accurate and compliant filings can be
expected, at least in those situations under the preparer’s
(compared with the taxpayer’s) control.
In addition to the qualifications concerning the
empirical findings discussed in this Article, the database
used gives rise to two more limitations. Specifically,
notwithstanding the many benefits of the 2000 EITC
Compliance Study database, it includes information of only
those taxpayers who claimed the EITC and were
subsequently selected for audit and review. For this reason,
some of the compliance trends and patterns identified in
this Article may be endemic to the entire tax system, while
others could be unique to EITC recipients. While there is
evidence to suggest that many of the predicaments
involving EITC noncompliance illustrate problems
characteristic of the entire tax system,210 it is difficult to
draw firm conclusions without additional information.211
Finally, prior to the 2011 preparer regulation, no
standard preparer identification number existed.212
210. See, e.g., Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Ways and Means, 108th Cong. 95-96 (2003) (statement of Leonard E. Burman
Senior Fellow, Urban Institute, Co-Director, Tax Policy Center, and Research
Professor, Georgetown Public Policy Institute).
211. Compliance with tax credits, deductions and allowances other than the
EITC is generally not verified by the IRS. Hence, it is difficult to conclude that
EITC compliance is inherently different (e.g., greater or lower) than compliance
with other provisions in the tax code. Accordingly, research efforts should
continue to explore taxpayer compliance with other provisions in order to
provide for a more comprehensive tax compliance assessment.
212. Until the 2011 preparer regulation, three different identification
numbers existed for paid preparers. These included: (1) preparer social security
number (SSN), (2) employer identification number (EIN), and (3) preparer
identification number (PTIN). Preparers could have used any of these three
numbers to identify themselves on the returns they prepared. However, the
2011 regulation requires all paid preparers to register and obtain a PTIN
number for them to use. For the background efforts to establish a system for an
all inclusive preparer identification number, see TIGTA (2009), supra note 2, at
3, 4, 19; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N 4832, RETURN PREPARER REV. 33 (2009)
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Accordingly, return information often did not reveal the
precise identity of the preparer involved and, therefore did
not allow assessment of the effect this particular preparer
had on taxpayer compliance, based on the returns he or she
filed.213 Therefore, the analysis undertaken in this Article
utilizes the group-based preparer types provided in the 2000
EITC compliance study.
However, the analysis and deficiencies identified in
returns preparers file (as well as in self-prepared returns)
only crystallize the urgent need to administer a uniform
system of preparer identification numbers. This is
important not only for ensuring the integrity of the tax
system when identifying problematic patterns of preparer
filing, but also in protecting innocent taxpayers and the
broader preparation industry against those who undermine
this important profession. For this reason, the mandatory
PTIN requirement established in the 2011 preparer
regulation is a welcome advancement. This requirement
may serve a key function in effectively facilitating further
administrative mechanisms in the coming years, including
advancing preparer and taxpayer outreach and oversight.
CONCLUSION
This Article empirically explores the strengths and
challenges of tax preparer usage and, particularly, the role
preparers play in taxpayer compliance and administration.
Considering the obligation U.S. taxpayers face yearly in
filing their returns and the significant rise in the complexity
of the tax code, it is not surprising that the majority of
taxpayers choose to rely on third-party preparation services.
What is both surprising and disconcerting is the extensive
lack of data and research in this area. Without basic
information on matters such as the experience level,
professional affiliation, and past filing behavior of
preparers, the tax administration, taxpayers, and policy
(indicating that the IRS lacks resources to offer a unified preparer system and
progress in that direction will have to be gradual).
213. This deficiency has hindered important compliance efforts, including
identifying unscrupulous preparers, keeping preparers in check as a matter of
routine administration practice, and taking appropriate enforcement actions
against relevant preparers to ensure the integrity of professional aid on the one
hand, and of tax administration at large on the other.
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officials remain ill-informed of the strengths and
deficiencies involved in preparation services. Furthermore,
the system of taxation, which greatly depends on an honor
system of self-reporting, becomes critically susceptible to
abuse from within. Future works should therefore continue
to explore this area of taxpayer compliance, including the
growing use of preparation software and the political role
the preparer industry plays in software regulation, or lack
thereof.214
On the theoretical-policy spectrum, it is beneficial to
further explore the proposition of a three-player game
metric. In this context, audit and review formulas, for
example, may not only track problematic taxpayers but
could also focus on flagging unscrupulous professionals and
setting clear standards for industry operation. All preparers
should be held accountable for their service. The
disconcerting evidence regarding Enrolled Agents does not
necessarily mean that regulating preparers is an ineffective
policy alternative, a point that can be illustrated by the
generally compliant filing results for CPA/Attorney and
IRS/VITA/TCE returns. However, IRS standards and
supervision of Enrolled Agents might be seriously deficient
and should be thoroughly reexamined, particularly in light
of the expanded registration and competency requirements
set by the new preparer regulation. On the other hand, the
compliant filing results for Large National Chains suggest
that internal industry or guild standards, when properly
applied, could serve as a complementary tool for ensuring a
reliable and compliance-enhancing preparation industry,
albeit still not as effectively as when external standards are
applied and monitored.

214. See, e.g., RETURN PREPARER REVIEW, supra note 8, at 9-10 (“Despite large
volumes of returns prepared using consumers and commercial tax preparation
software, quality control over these products rests exclusively with the software
publishers. There are approximately 80 preparation software packages available
for purchase in the U.S. currently. . . . While the number of tax software
providers appears robust, four companies dominate the market, accounting for
80% of the tax returns filed electronically over the last two years.”).
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Appendix A

Preparer Type

Number of Returns*

CPA/Attorney

314

Enrolled Agent

117

Friend/Relative

257

Large National Chain

707

IRS/VITA/TCE

52

Other Preparer

105

Other Professional Preparer

1226

Taxpayer

488

Null

191

Total

3457

* Detailing the number and distribution of returns audited
for the 2000 EITC compliance study. Any discrepancy in the
amount claimed on the returns originally filed and that
which the IRS determined after audit and review was
multiplied by the weighting factor identified in the random
sample to infer results for the entire EITC population.
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Appendix B
Preparer

% Electronic Filers

CPA/Attorney

32.1%

Enrolled Agent

29.9%

Friend/Relative

17.8%

Large National Chain

94.2%

IRS/VITA/TCE

46.1%

Other Preparer

43.2%

Other Professional Preparer

53.0%

Taxpayer

27.0%

Appendix C
Preparer

% with
Schedule C

% with Itemized
Deductions

CP/Attorney

32.5%

11.83%

Enrolled Agent

53.5%

13.84%

Friend/Relative

12.9%

5.51%

Large National Chain

12.9%

1.85%

IRS/VITA/TCE

5.1%

3.89%

Other Preparer

10.9%

4.56%

Other Professional
Preparer

22.8%

6.86%

Taxpayer

16.9%

5.09%
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Appendix D

Percentage of Tax Returns with a Change in Filing Status
Type of Preparer

Change Rate in
Filing Status

Change Rate When
Originally Claiming
Head of Household

CPA/Attorney

11.4%

23.6%

Enrolled Agent

21.0%

48.4%

Friend/Relative

29.9%

46.3%

Large National Chain

24.7%

34.5%

IRS/VITA/TCE

22.2%

32.5%

Other Preparer

37.6%

56.6%

Other Professional
Preparer

30.7%

46.2%

Taxpayer

16.9%

30.3%

